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[Paik Nak-chung] Toward a New Encounter

November 15, 2007

Paik Nak-chung Editor, the Quarterly Changbi . Professor Emeritus of English Literature, Seoul National University This address was delivered at the opening session of the 2007 Jeonju Asia-Africa Literature Festival (AALF) at Jeonbuk National University, Jeonju, Korea, on November 9, 2007. © Paik Nak-chung 2007 —————————————————————————————————————————————————————————— Yesterday I gave a welcoming speech as chair of the AALF Organizing Committee. Today I am going to offer you some personal thoughts according to the decision by my younger Committee colleagues, who, without consulting the chairman, invited me to deliver this speech. I am nevertheless honored and delighted by the invitation. Asia and Africa are vast and diverse places, each comprising a world on its own. Even the concept of a continent with the name ‘Asia’ or ‘Africa’ did not emerge until Europeans gave those names. Numerous civilizations merely have come and gone, many of them with histories much more ancient than Europe. Asia and Africa, however, share the common experience of being marginalized by the Europeans as the Other, and of having had most areas fall victim to European colonialism. Among those that escaped direct rule by Western nations, China suffered from various colonialist invasions and partial occupations, and Korea was colonized by a surrogate imperial power. Even Japan, which achieved early success in imitating the West, has not been free of cultural and intellectual colonialization and, in my opinion, still shows symptoms of its aftereffects. Africa and Asia also share the feature that the preponderant majority of their population is suffering from poverty, disease, dictatorship and exploitation. Among them, Iraq suffers direct occupation by the hegemonic superpower, while Palestine would offer an instance of surrogate occupation. As for Korea, although I do not believe foreign powers are solely responsible for the continuing national division on the Korean peninsula, the division initially engineered mainly by the United States continues to fetter the people of both Koreas. In short, the rich legacy of African and Asian civilizations has been either defaced or insufficiently recognized because of such a state of affairs, and the creative energies of Asian and African writers have been either oppressed or, when productive and fruitful, have been marginalized on the world stage. Even our mutual contacts are usually dependent on the languages and publishing markets of the hegemonic nations. Endeavors were not lacking in the past to build direct networks of dialogues and solidarity, overcoming dependency and marginality. A good example is the Afro-Asian Writers’ Conference and its activities in the middle and late decades of the past century. There were also attempts to include Latin American writers in a wider solidarity. Some of you in the audience have personal experiences of working in these movements. Although they advocated ‘non-alignment’, African and Asian writers’ movements in the past century were actually on closer terms with the socialist bloc, and in any case operated within the framework of the Cold War regime. Therefore, the end of the East-West Cold War and the collapse of the socialist bloc led to the weakening and virtual demise of the Afro-Asian Writers’ Conference. The Korean peninsula failed to make significant contributions to that movement. Politically, North Korea was an important member of the ‘Non-Aligned Movement’, and even hosted the Afro-Asian Writers’ Conference in Pyongyang, but their literary contributions, I believe, were rather limited. South Korea, on the other hand, did have a vigorous presence of writers espousing what we then called ‘the Third-World perspective’, but because of its heavy dependence on the United States could hardly claim a respectable share in the Non-Aligned Movement or the Afro-Asian Writers’ Conference. When we Korean writers look back on this regrettable past, we are all the happier that we can host this Asia-Africa Literature Festival in Jeonju. This has been possible because in the ensuing years South Korea has successfully struggled for democracy and economic development, and continued to reduce its dependence on the United States. At the same time, the world today needs a new type of solidarity in order to resist the ever-spreading sway of global capital after the end of the East-West confrontation. Now more than ever we need to realize that ‘the Third-World perspective’ should serve not to divide the globe into three parts but to see the problems of a single globe from the point of view of ordinary people rather than that of the vested interests of either the ‘First World’ or the ‘Second’. It is time that we organized our creative energies and collective wisdom accordingly. This festival, too, is a part of that project. In a sense, it seems appropriate for a country like South Korea to play a special role in this endeavor, a country neither too rich nor helplessly poor, placed somewhere between the so-called First World and the Third World, a country that, moreover, has entered the process of reconciliation, cooperation and gradual reintegration of the socialist North and the capitalist South. In any event, it is beyond all doubts a great blessing for us Korean writers. The encounter with fellow Asian and African writers will also be a valuable occasion for us to rethink and sort out our own literary agendas. In the days when we were fighting military dictatorship and had to struggle for the very space for reunification movements, the idea of ‘national literature’ served Korean writers of resistance as a rallying point their political and literary endeavors. ‘National literature’ in this context is a very specific notion based on the unique reality of divided Korea. Refusing to be the literature of only one half of the divided nation, it aspired to be the literature of the entire Korean nation-in other words, a literature of the people, representing the desires and needs of the preponderant majority of the population across the peninsula. However, ‘national Literature’ no longer serves as a productive slogan in today’s Korea. Since the Democracy Struggles of June 1987, South Korea has continued its process of democratization, accompanied by a further deepening of capitalism, and as a result, it now shows signs of rapidly turning into a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society. However, I cannot agree with some of those in Korea’s literary world who dismiss as outmoded nationalism even the vision for a reunified Korea contained in the discourse of national literature, especially since that vision proposed not a simple end to the partition of the land but the building of a more humane society than that under the current division system and thus contributing to the endeavors toward a new civilization for humankind. Such a wholesale abandonment of the project of ‘national literature’ with its emphasis on writers’ sense of responsibility for the realities of national division, can only make ourselves more easily subject to the neo-liberal trends that all the more effectively carries out the essentially anti-artistic and anti-poetic logic of capitalism by tolerating or even encouraging a certain degree of individual and collective differences. I believe the Asian and African writers in attendance today will not find it difficult to empathize with the problems faced by Korean writers, even though you belong to societies very different from Korea. For you must have worked to give voice to the sufferings of your own people, and often espoused urgent national agendas, but you must also have felt the need for international solidarity and the importance of high artistic standards. We do have to move beyond simple-minded militancy and nationalism, but we should not surrender ourselves, in the name of ‘global standards’ and intellectual sophistication, to neoliberal global domination that threatens the life of literature itself. The Third World, I repeat, cannot be confined to specific regions of the globe. The Third World is there in the so-called First World and in the erstwhile Second World as well; while within the nations designated as the Third World, we find First-World elements, and even attempts to enlarge their privileges by touting the cause of the ‘Third World’. That art and literature that enable us to see this complex world with clear eyes and a balanced mind will truly deserve the name of art. In order to achieve such genuine art and literature, we shall have to pay much more attention to the experiences of continents and nations alienated from the center of the world-system, even though the concept of the Third World is not a cartographical one. And we have to build a network of dialogue and communication of those writers who tend to be neglected in the world literary market precisely because they respect the experiences of Asia and Africa, so that these writers can come together to recognize their mutual good will and can strengthen their passion for true art and literature. Needless to say, each of us will need above all to devote ourselves more wholeheartedly than ever to his or her daily creative work. I hope this 2007 Asia-Africa Literature Festival in Jeonju will be a point of departure for many more creative encounters. Thank you very much.
[Hwang Jeong-mi] Time to Qualify, Not Quantify, Motherhood

September 13, 2007

Time to Qualify, Not Quantify, Motherhood Hwang Jeong-mi Researcher of Korean Women’s Development Institute This article was published in The Changbi Weekly Commentary (2007.5.29) and translated by Korea Foundation later (see the webzine of Korea Foundation, KOREA FOCUS [http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/]). © Hwang Jeong-mi 2007
[John Lanchester] Warmer, Warmer

September 3, 2007

Warmer, Warmer John Lancester John Lanchester is an English novelist and contributing editor of the London Review of Books. He is a regular contributor to several newspapers and magazines, including Granta, the New Yorker and The Observer. His first novel, the highly acclaimed The Debt to Pleasure (1996) won the Whitbread First Novel Award, the Betty Trask Prize, the Hawthornden Prize. HIs most recent work is a book of memoir, Family Romance (2007). * The Korean translation of this article was published in the Quarterly Changbi (Autumn 2007). © John Lanchester 2007
[Paik Nak-chung] Twenty Years After June 1987: Where Are We Now, and W…

June 7, 2007

Paik Nak-chung Editor, the Quarterly Changbi . Professor Emeritus of English Literature, Seoul National University This is the English version of the keynote speech at the International Symposium ‘Democracy and Peace-Building in Korea and the Choice of 2007’, Los Angeles, California, USA, May 12, 2007, co-sponsored by the Korea Democracy Foundation, Center for Korean Studies at UCLA, and the Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation in the US. Footnotes have been added subsequently. © Paik Nak-chung 2007 ———————————————————————————————————————————————————————– I. The June Struggle for Democracy and the Regime of 1987 The nationwide uprising of June 1987 put an end to the tyrannical rule of Chun Du-hwan’s regime and opened a new chapter in South Korea’s contemporary history. True, it has had its background in the April 19th Student Revolution of 1960, the Pusan-Masan Uprising of 1979 and the May Democratic Struggle of Kwangju 1980. But it represents a categorically new achievement in having initiated a democratization process that has continued for the past twenty years without experiencing reversals such as the military takeovers of May 16, 1961 and May 17, 1980. At the same time, there is a prevalent sense of crisis in Korea today that the so-called ’87 regime that was formed after June 1987 has now reached its limit and is in need of a new breakthrough. While searching for an answer, some analysts offer a diagnosis that although formal and procedural democracy was achieved through the June Struggle, substantive democracy in the economic and social fields has remained inadequate or has even suffered a retreat. This view grasps only part of the truth and we must beware of such a facile dichotomy. Political democracy itself, even after its foundation was laid by the establishment of a democratic constitution and the direct presidential election in 1987, still had to be fought for and arduously extended at each step through the regimes of Roh Tae-woo, Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Mu-hyun. Nor can we yet assure ourselves of its ‘irreversible achievement’, even though the possibility of reversal through a military coup has more or less been eliminated. Furthermore, just as the July-August Great Labor Struggles of 1987 led both to improvements in workers’ welfare and an advance in procedural democracy, the distinction between the ‘form’ and ‘substance’ of democracy is at best facile. Behind the easy resort to such distinction is the assumption that the true aim of the June Struggle was to build ‘people’s democracy’ or socialism—or at least social democracy—in South Korea. From such a vantage point, the June 29th Declaration (by government candidate Roh Tae-woo acceding to many of the protesters’ overt demands) was nothing more than a deceptive move to prevent the full success of the popular struggle, and such interpretation turns the past twenty years into a period of thwarted hopes where the people won the shell but lost the core of democracy. In my view, this is a very one-sided interpretation of Korea’s reality. Going beyond such one-sidedness is an important task for us as we commemorate the 20th anniversary of the June Struggle. At any rate, there exists a broad consensus that the ‘regime of 1987’ (if we call by that name the general political, economic, and social order created by the June Struggle and its immediate aftermath) constitutes an order much superior to what preceded it, but that it was from the beginning an unstable structure based on a number of make-shift compromises, and has by now almost reached the end of its tether. True, some would go further and assert that it was already replaced by the ‘regime of 1997’ at the time of the financial crisis and the IMF bailout. Others contend that the ’87 regime has been finally destroyed in 2007 by the government’s arbitrary decision to conclude a Free Trade Agreement with the United States; while still others, of the ‘New Right’, call for the launching of a ‘regime of 2007’ in a different sense, namely, one that puts an end to the ‘pro-North Korean leftist regimes’ (i.e., those of Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-hyun) through this year’s presidential election. All in all, one rarely hears a voice claiming the health of the ’87 regime and its warrant for continued existence. II. Looking Beyond the ’87 Regime The vision of overcoming the ’87 regime depends largely on what we consider to be the larger system of which the ’87 regime is a subclass, and within what more comprehensive scheme of periodization we place the post-1987 period. For instance, the argument (including the above mentioned notion of ‘the 1997 regime’) that the progress in political democracy since 1987 actually amounts to the failure of substantive democracy, accompanied as it was with the ascendancy of neoliberalism, represents a point of view that seeks to understand the South Korean society of the last twenty years mainly in terms of the ‘neoliberal phase’ (beginning in the early 1980s) of the modern world-system. It is an undeniable fact that South Korea exists as a part of the capitalist world-system, and that the global trend of neoliberalism has exercised a great influence on the post-1987 history. However, in order to determine the precise extent and manner of that influence, and the best possible response that South Korean society may adopt toward it, we need not only a more exact understanding of neoliberalism, but a closer analysis of the concrete ways in which it affects Korean society. I am no expert in either of the two topics, but I will try to lay down my basic understanding of the concept of neoliberalism. In my view, it is an attempt to return to an even older form of liberalism than the ‘old’ liberalism itself, namely, to liberalism in its early days before it managed through a laborious route to combine itself with values of democracy and the welfare state. Capitalism in its crisis of accumulation in the late twentieth century has decided to subvert those values and replace them with the resuscitated doctrine of unrestricted free market.[1] One may well doubt whether this ‘new’ liberalism may even qualify as ‘liberalism’, since it has lost even the progressive aspects of early capitalism, such as the removal of feudal fetters and the promotion of healthy individualism, attempting instead to solidify the inequalities created by contemporary capitalism. Even so, the effects of neoliberalism differ according to the time and place. In South Korea’s case, the decisive turning point for its ascendancy was the financial crisis of 1997, but the consequences also included the implementation of certain reforms either liberal or democratic in nature that Korean society urgently required. Ending the arbitrary dominance over the financial institutions by the government was one of them, and the financial crisis also helped the peaceful transition of political power to the opposition in 1998, facilitating the political reforms in the initial days of the Kim Daejung government. Of course, one may offer the counterargument that all such reforms only contributed to the expansion of liberal politics and the establishment of capitalist institutions, but in that case one must produce a fuller critique of liberalism or capitalism per se, together with persuasive short-, middle- and long-term projects for countering it, rather than using ‘neoliberalism’ as a blanket term to include everything one opposes. Global perspective is not the only requirement necessary to illuminate the concrete nature of the ’87 regime. The peninsular or all-Korean perspective must come into play as well, given the fact that Korea still is a divided country. At a symposium commemorating the 10th anniversary of the June Struggle, I proposed that “instead of seeing the June Democratic Uprising only within the context of South Korea’s history, we should comprehend and evaluate it as an occurrence within the peninsula-wide division system.” (‘The Historical Significance of the June Struggle and the Meaning of its Tenth Anniversary’, The Shaking Division System, Seoul: Changbi Publishers, 1998, p. 212) Although the country was first partitioned in 1945 and separate regimes established in 1948, it was only after the Korean War ended in a stalemate in 1953 that the division came to take on a certain systemic character.[2] This division system subsequently survived such challenges as the April Revolution of 1960 and the Kwangju Uprising of 1980, and was not terminated by the June Struggle of 1987, either. When seen from this perspective, the ’87 regime comprises a subclass of what we may call the 1953 regime. But the division system entered a period of instability when one of its pillars, the military dictatorship in the South, was overturned. It lost another, a crucial one at the global level, when the East-West Cold War came to an end. Then in June 2000, with the North-South summit meeting in Pyongyang and the June 15 Joint Declaration issued there, the prospect of overcoming the ’53 regime finally came into view. As this brief survey shows, applying the peninsular perspective on the ’87 regime is not a ‘division-centered reductionism’ that emphasizes only the inter-Korean relations at the expense of changes within South Korea or the global geopolitical order. The very term ‘1987 regime’ is an appellation that foregrounds events internal to the South, and implies such major domestic agendas as continuation of the democratizing process, the search for a new developmental model, and either the accommodation or the rejection of neoliberalism. But the peninsular perspective does insist on not losing sight of the fact that responses even to these domestic agendas operate within the force field of the division system and that domestic progress in democracy has owed much of its success to factors like reunification movements at the civilian level, which never stopped even under the ’53 regime, and to attempts at the government level to mitigate the North-South confrontation such as the Roh Tae-woo regime’s ‘Northern policy’ (itself an achievement of the ’87 regime). Consequently, the recognition in the division system theory of the decisive significance of the year 2000 represents a different stance from that of ‘national liberation’ or nationalistic privileging of reunification above all other goals. The ‘Age of June 15’ that takes the year 2000 as its starting point does have a special meaning in providing a periodization scheme that the two Koreas have seldom been able to share since the partition in 1945, and especially since 1953 (the year of the Armistice), but the degree of its realization in terms of the concrete social reality on either side remains rather limited. Not that it has been working at the symbolic and ideological level only, for its impact on everyday life, too, has been considerable. Yet, speaking of the South, ‘the Age of June 15’ has not terminated the ’53 regime and indeed, cannot even be said to have ended the ’87 regime. The IMF crisis of 1997 was much more powerful so far as direct impact on South Korean people’s daily lives is concerned. To find in it the inauguration of the ’97 regime, however, amounts to an overestimation of the progressive character of the ’87 regime. In other words, such a view minimizes the many inherent limitations of this regime as a subclass of the ’53 regime, and overlooks the fact that the 1997 financial crisis was no more than a dramatic exposure of South Korean society’s pursuit, in some ways more reckless than anything before 1987, of the dream of ‘joining the advanced nations’ and ‘absorbing North Korea’. At the same time, it is still another oversimplification to assume that the positive dynamics of the ’87 regime were totally exhausted in the IMF crisis. Again, more adequate appraisals demand the peninsular perspective, which provides a much more complex yet in its own way a coherent picture of the interconnections between 1987, 1997 and 2000. In this picture, 1987 marks a decisive turning point in the democratization of South Korea and inaugurates the ‘period of oscillation’ of the division system, but neither the constitution nor the major political parties nor even most of the social movements of the ’87 regime set out with ‘the overcoming of the division system’ as a clearly conceived agenda. The consequent accumulation of unresolved problems led to the economic crisis of 1997 and in combination with the crisis in the North including the food crisis, came to seriously challenge the division system. The ensuing June 15 Joint Declaration would then represent at once the direct effect of the peninsula-wide crisis and the product of the resilience and dynamism of the Korean people seeking a new opening in mutual reconciliation, cooperation and gradual reintegration, rather than in persisting with the status quo or resorting to an increased dependence on foreign powers. I have argued that the year 2000 marks the turning point from the division system’s period of ‘oscillation’ to ‘disintegration’ (`Unification Korean-Style, Present Progressive Tense, Changbi Publishers 2006, p. 6), but periodizations that take as their respective unit of analysis the whole Korean peninsula and only one half of it need not be in full agreement. Thus, the view that the ’87 regime in the South has persisted beyond 2000 does not necessarily contradict the notion of ‘the period of disintegration of the division system’ that begins in the year 2000. However, for such disintegration to run its course and lead to a better system, the overcoming of the decrepit ’87 regime in the South is a prerequisite. The 20th anniversary of the June Struggle, when the international conjuncture seems more favorable than ever for the establishment of a framework for peace in the Korean peninsula, and the terminal symptoms of the ’87 regime are becoming daily more apparent, would be the moment for taking a decisive step toward a new age. III. South Korea’s Choice in 2007 2007 also happens to be the year of the presidential election in the South—another reason for its potential as a decisive watershed. Voices in the conservative camps of South Korea, too, find in this year’s presidential election a crossroads for the entire peninsula, rather than just an opportunity for retrieving political power in the South. The goal is to put an end to the period of drifting since 1987, particularly the rule of ‘pro-North leftist’ forces over the last ten years and to launch a regime of ‘becoming advanced’. In my view however, the electoral victory of the conservative opposition will hardly result in overcoming the ’87 regime. Despite the belligerent pronouncements by speakers of the ‘New Right’ and hardliners within the opposition party, I do not believe that even if returned to office, they can overturn the results of the democratization process since 1987 or abrogate the June 15 Joint Declaration. On the other hand, with the prolonging of the ‘bad stalemate’ of the ’87 regime, this regime’s terminal symptoms may become aggravated. This is not a partisan argument to oppose in principle the coming to power of a particular political party. It merely conveys the judgment that any party that seizes power under the hegemony of elements that find little to criticize in the ’53 regime—not even in the ’53 regime before 1987—and consider the period of democratic reform governments as nothing but ‘ten lost years’ can only add to the woes of the waning ’87 regime. Indeed, things will not prove any better even if a ‘grand conservative coalition’ of some sort is formed under a government that once proudly flaunted its reformist and democratic credentials but is now attempting to force a speedy conclusion of the Korea-US FTA with conservative blessings. ‘Radical (or transformative) centrism’ is the term I have used to characterize what today’s Korean society needs. (Unification Korean-Style, Present Progressive Tense, pp. 30-31, 58-60) Its explicit use dates from a relatively recent past, but actually it was already apparent with the opening of a new stage after the June Struggle that neither of the two main currents of the radical movement, namely, ‘national liberation’ and ‘people’s revolution’, nor moderate reformism lacking any visions of social transformation, could meet the demands of the time. [3]In the period of tyrannical rule by the government of a divided nation, mere advocacy of the principle of peaceful and autonomous reunification or of an egalitarian society, or the immediate struggle for basic civil rights could serve to shake the division system. However, with the end of military dictatorship and the newly opened space for more substantive endeavors, the need arose for a centrist line that could incorporate the various agendas of various forces with a view to a clearly conceived goal of transforming the division system. Close to twenty years later, Korea now finds itself in an even more urgent need of a line focused on radical transformation in this sense and broadly centrist in practice. Since the ’87 regime essentially comprises a part of the ’53 regime and many of its problems derive from the vertical repressiveness (vis-à-vis its people) and lateral weakness (vis-à-vis foreign powers) of the division system itself, any project of overcoming the ‘87 regime that lacks a broader design of transforming the division system can hardly succeed. This is true not only of the conservative logic that finds little problem with the ’53 regime, but also of the ‘anti-neoliberal’ position that underestimates the determinative influence of the division system, and of the line of ‘reunification through national self-reliance opposing American obstruction’, which does foreground the fact of national division but remains too little aware of its systemic character. As a matter of fact, forces of progressive reform had managed to form a fairly broad coalition in the movement criticizing the Korea-US FTA negotiations. Along with forces opposing the FTA from the start for reasons of ‘national autonomy’ or ‘social equality’, people critical of the conduct and certain particulars of the negotiations joined in the efforts to stop an overhasty agreement. The result, as is well known, was a failure: the deal was announced in early April in time to meet the deadline set by America’s Trade Promotion Act. The biggest cause for that failure must be the determined drive on the part of President Roh Moo-hyun and his ‘participatory government,’ while one contributing factor may be found in the temporary setback suffered by popular movements when North Korea carried out a nuclear test in October 2006. We must also admit, however, that the movement itself, unable to go beyond a largely tactical alliance of various camps with different implicit agendas, showed a limit in its ability to persuade a preponderant majority of the population. With the successful conclusion of the negotiations, even that tactical alliance has suffered considerable damage. Some of the once moderate critics have moved to a more militant position rejecting outright the results of the negotiation, but many others have resigned themselves to the eventual ratification of the FTA and are adopting the line that, having succeeded in removing some of the worst provisions, we ought now try to make the best of the situation and prepare for the aftermath. On another side, those who have opposed in principle all free trade agreements, or at least any FTA with the United States, are enraged by the deal yet also welcome the new political terrain where a clear line seems to be drawn between two camps, for and against the Korea-US FTA. The point, however, is whether such a configuration augurs well for overcoming the ’87 regime. The strengthening of the more radical progressive camp(s) in such an alignment will not be without its positive meanings. But there is an acute risk that an easy electoral victory for the conservative opposition, plus the existence of radical sects satisfied with mere quantitative expansion, may prolong and further embitter the downward slide of the ’87 regime in its final days. Precisely at this moment when room for unprincipled ‘middle of the road reformists’ has shrunk due to the conclusion of the FTA negotiations, we should bring about a regrouping of forces for progressive reform with ‘radical centrism’ as their main tenet—without of course, necessarily holding on to the term as an electoral slogan. It is not certain whether these forces, plagued by the divisive influence of the so-called KORUS FTA, can achieve such unity. But just as a broad alliance was formed to oppose a rash deal, a similar alliance is both possible and necessary to prevent a quick ratification and the many undemocratic practices foreseeable in the process; and it need not be ruled out that, on the strength of a thorough and responsible scrutiny of the contents of the deal and their implications, the movement may come to agree on a course of action that will obtain wide popular support. Only, this time it must manage to go beyond mere tactical alliance and be able to persuade the public with a clear insight into the nature of the ’87 regime and with effective projects for overcoming the division system. IV. ‘Reunification Korean-style’ and the Role of ‘the Third Party’ ‘Radical centrism’ can become a realistic alternative because of the unique character of the reality of the Korean peninsula. Korea is peculiar enough in remaining divided to this day, but it constitutes a truly unprecedented case in that the process of its reintegration differs from any previous case of national unification. Briefly put, not only is a Vietnamese-style reunification through military conquest out of the question in Korea, but even a peaceful reunification, unlike that of Germany or of Yemen, can only proceed gradually, stage by stage. And it so happens that such a reunification process has already been agreed to between the top leaders of North and South Korea in the June 15 Joint Declaration. Such an agreement has a far-reaching effect not confined to the relations between the two governments. Initiatives by ordinary citizens are bound to be limited in a speedy, one-shot unification, whether violent or peaceful. In contrast, a gradual, step-by-step process opens up space for civic participation. And where, as in South Korea, civil society possesses both the will and the ability to utilize this space, citizens’ say in determining the timing and the specific contents of a given intermediate stage must continue to increase, and eventually it will not be possible to prevent the sphere of civic participation extending to the entire peninsula. From such viewpoint, I have argued that South Korea’s civil society—taking it in a broad sense to include the private business sector as well—ought to function as a ‘third party’ besides the two governments. As yet, this ‘third party’ remains far too weak to act as an equal partner, nor does our civil society display sufficient self-consciousness or self-esteem as ‘the third party’. But the expansion of civic participation will be inevitable as the DPRK-US relations improve and inter-Korean exchanges proceed in full swing. Here I shall consider two contingencies in which the role of ‘the third party’ may prove decisive. One may come about in the course of resolving the issue of North Korea’s nuclear programs. As I prepare this text at the end of April, no solution has yet been found to the problem of North Korean accounts at BDA (Banco Delta Asia in Macao), and the initial steps specified by the February 13th Agreement have not been followed through. Yet the more general view still is that the Six-Party Talks will be able, even if after repeated delays, to go through the second stage of ‘disablement’, while considerable skepticism prevails regarding the possibility of reaching the final stage of ‘dismantlement’ of all nuclear programs. Of course, we need not give up hopes of completing at some time the third stage as well, since North Korean authorities have strongly asserted that “the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is an injunction to posterity by the late President Kim Il Sung” and also because the United States will not agree to provide adequate compensation for any settlement short of ‘dismantlement’. The problem will arise however, in the event of a tacit collusion occurring between America’s preference for withholding compensation and maintaining an appropriately controlled ‘low-intensity nuclear crisis’ and the North Korean calculation that there exists no surer means of regime security than possessing nuclear weapons. This of course is sheer conjecture, but if or when such a situation comes into existence, one can hardly expect the South Korean government to display sufficient will or capability to effect a breakthrough. It will be a case requiring interventions by a civil society that advocates denuclearization not only as the North Korean leader’s injunction to posterity but as a matter of utmost interest to the concrete lives of ordinary people in both Koreas. The special role of ‘the third party’ would also be essential when the nuclear problem is satisfactorily resolved, DPRK-US relations normalized, and inter-Korean exchanges greatly expanded. One need not resort to the logic of hard-line defenders of vested interests to grant the possibility that such contingency might imply a real threat to the North Korean regime. A divided country is by definition unstable, and given the current balance of forces on the peninsula, it is the North that will feel seriously threatened by the presence of the other side. Probabilities for the smooth process of reform and opening in the manner of China or Vietnam should be rated low under the division system. At the same time, the realities of the peninsula rule out the possibility of removing the instabilities of a division regime either by agreeing to a permanent division or through a speedy reunification. Precisely this state of affairs gave rise to the agreement in the June 15 Joint Declaration that the two Koreas would work for reunification but without haste, by going through an intermediate stage of ‘union of states’ or ‘a low-level federation’.[4] But such an agreement will hardly be carried out if left to the authorities themselves. Even a confederative structure that leaves two sovereign states in existence will not offer a sufficient guarantee for the self-preservation of the North Korean regime and it is moreover in the nature of governments everywhere, including both Koreas, to desire either reunification on their own terms or else the status quo, and not to relish the prospect of handing over even a small portion of their power to organs of the confederation. All the same, while carrying on the process of reconciliation, cooperation and reintegration to meet the real needs of the people on both sides, we need a minimum institutional device to manage the dangers of that process. Provided that the only possible answer lies in a union of states or a loose confederation, there is for the moment no one besides ‘the third party’ to actively study and promote this project, nor will it be possible, without large-scale participation by it, to prepare the ground for such a confederation through various inter-Korean contacts and networks in every field. Finally, in lieu of a conclusion, I will briefly discuss the role of Koreans abroad. As the space for civilian efforts for reunification and for direct contact between North and South Koreans has expanded under the ’87 regime, and particularly after June 2000, we have come to depend less on devoted activists in the diaspora in the struggle against dictatorship and for national reconciliation. Moreover, once the building of a confederation emerges as the central agenda, the Korean diaspora can hardly be expected to play a role equal to that of the residents of the peninsula, since the confederation will be a confederation of the two Korean states, not a tripartite union of North, South and the diaspora. As a Resident Korean activist in Japan has put it, “the overseas Koreans will be the subjects of reunification like any other Korean, but the leading role must belong to the North and the South.” But precisely such a situation opens up the way for broad and diverse popular participation overseas as much as in South Korea during the ‘Age of June 15’. Without having to gird themselves for superhuman self-sacrifice, ordinary people can contribute towards the reunification process the experiences, visions and influences on the scene unavailable to the population of the peninsula, while remaining true to their daily lives in their respective places of residence or citizenship. This will be particularly true of the Korean and Korean-American communities in the United States, by their very presence in the most powerful nation on earth and with the wealth of outstanding talent among them. Their contribution will not only enrich the content of Korean-style reunification, but the project of building a global network of Koreans will become all the more meaningful as a result. They will also contribute in no negligible measure to making the future human civilization a more just and diverse world. —————————————————————————————————————————————————————————- [1] See David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford University Press 2005). [2] The literature on this topic is quite scanty in Western languages. My essay, Habermas on National Unification in Germany and New Left Review 1/219, Sept./Oct. 1996, may serve as a convenient introduction in English. Readers of Japanese may consult the Japanese edition of my book The Shaking Division System: Peku Nakuchong (Paik Nak-chung), Chosen hanto toitsu ron – yuragu bundan taisei (Tokyo: Kurein, 2001). [3] See Paik Nak-chung, The Reunification Movement and Literature (1989), especially the section Perspectives on the Period after the June Uprising, pp. 202-7, in Kenneth M. Wells, ed., South Korea’s Minjung Movement: The Culture and Politics of Dissidence University of Hawaii Press 1995. [4] It is noteworthy that while Pyongyang clings to the term yonbang (the Korean word for its official English translation calls for a Koryo Democratic Confederal [rather than Federal] Republic.
[Paik Nak-chung] Special News, Dateline Korea: Unification Korean-Styl…

March 19, 2007

Paik Nak-chung Editor, Creation and Criticism Quarterly . Professor Emeritus of English Literature, Seoul National University This is the text of a special lecture delivered at the 2007 IFJ (International Federation of Journalists)-JAK (Journalist Association of Korea) Special Conference in Korea on ‘Peace and Reconciliation in the Korean Peninsula’, 12 March 2007, at Lotte Hotel in Seoul. © Paik Nak-chung 2007 ———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————- It is an honor to address this gathering of journalists from all over the world who have come to Korea to discuss and promote peace and reconciliation in the peninsula. ‘Special news’ in the title is meant to whet your professional appetites, but as seasoned journalists you must also be aware that the actual content does not always live up to sensational headlines. In any case, let me start with what is no longer news. With the February 13 agreements at the Six-Party talks in Beijing, the situation in and around the Korean peninsula has taken a distinctly favorable turn towards the twin goals of denuclearizing the peninsula and normalizing the relations between DPRK and the United States. It’s too early to predict the final outcome, but this time we have a very specific action plan, though a limited one, and both between the two Koreas and between DPRK and each of the directly concerned parties (notably the U.S., Japan, and the IAEA) serious contacts and negotiations have either already begun or are soon to take place. All in all, prospects for peace and reconciliation in the Korean peninsula look brighter than at any time in recent years. As I say, this is hardly news. What I offer as special news is that not simply ‘peace and reconciliation’ but reunification of the Korean peninsula is in progress, and has been in progress for the past several years. Even this isn’t exactly a breaking news, for a book I published last year (alas, in Korean only) was titled Unification Korean-Style, Present Progressive Tense. But is this ‘special news’ a true report? Isn’t it a wild exaggeration, or even an outright falsification, given the undeniable continuance of the Military Demarcation Line dividing the peninsula? My claim would all too obviously amount to sheer nonsense unless we were to perform a radical redefinition of the term ‘reunification’. And here I offer you another piece of news: such a redefinition, too, has been going on for some years now. Moreover, the success of that task is crucial not only for reunification but for peace in the Korean peninsula. Many foreigners, genuinely concerned for peace in Korea but naturally less preoccupied with reunification, tend to be puzzled by such conflation of the two issues. Why can’t Koreans be reasonable, they often ask, and try to co-exist in peace rather than always be harping on unification? Peaceful co-existence was exactly what the Germans in the decades of division worked for, with the result that they not only managed to preserve peace but even achieved reunification as an unexpected reward. Koreans should do the same, (so the argument goes,) and while they may or may not be rewarded with a similar surprise, they will in any case have peace, which represents both a more tangible and a more universal value than national unity. Nor is such a way of thinking limited to foreigners, needless to say. In contrast, if we take the case of pre-unification Vietnam, advocating ‘peace in division’ would have been but a thinly disguised apology for continued colonial dominance. Some Koreans place a great emphasis on this lesson and still consider ‘national liberation’ the fundamental task of the day. The actual situation, however, falls somewhere in-between. In other words, Korea’s reality fits neither the German nor the Vietnamese pattern. In the sense that the country’s division in 1945 was imposed without any legitimate cause, an act of further victimizing a nation previously victimized by the aggressor power (Japan), it resembled Vietnam’s more than Germany’s division, and also in representing an attempt by the hegemonic power (USA) to control a Third World people. But in contrast to Vietnam, the Korean War ended in a stalemate in 1953, and the structure of division since then has acquired a certain stability and power of self-reproduction-enough to justify, in my opinion, finding a ‘division system’ in force. Yet the fact that such stability was reached only through a bloody civil war (as well as an international one) makes for another crucial difference from Germany, where the division was sustained mainly by the East-West confrontation and thus could lead to a quick reunification when the Cold War ended. It naturally follows then that neither the German nor Vietnamese formula for unification would work in Korea. On the one hand, overzealous pursuit of reunification would pose a threat to peace, because the North will resist at all costs the German type of peaceful annexation, let alone military invasion. Indeed, simplistic discourse of national unity must delay reunification itself, since it will only strengthen the division system by fanning popular fear of what a sudden reunification might bring. On the other hand, pursuit of peaceful coexistence at the expense of national unity is also an illusory project and ultimately destabilizing to peace as well. This is so in principle because of the fundamental illegitimacy of the division system, which makes any project for its perpetuation lose legitimacy in the eyes of the majority of the population. But in more practical terms, we must note that the system has already been dangerously destabilized-The Shaking Division System (Seoul: Changbi Publishers, 1998) is another title of mine-due to 1) democratization of South Korea since 1987, which removed one of the main props of the division system by putting an end to military dictatorship; 2) the end of the East-West Cold War, which, though not as decisive a factor as in German division, nevertheless did away with another major prop; and 3) an increasing imbalance of power between the two Koreas, partly as a consequence of that geopolitical change, prompting the imperiled North to rely more and more on military force even to the extent of undertaking nuclear armament. If neither a Vietnamese nor a German type of solution will do, what other way is there? (I will just remark in passing that the somewhat different Yemenite type doesn’t apply, either.) Now the frequently forgotten fact, even among Koreans who ought to know better, is that a distinctly Korean way out of the dilemma was already agreed to and promulgated by the top leaders of the two Koreas in the year 2000, in the June 15 North-South Joint Declaration. Article 2 reads: “The North and the South, recognizing that the low-level federation proposed by the North and the commonwealth system proposed by the South for the reunification of the country have similarity, agreed to work together in the future for reunification in this direction.” For all the intentional (and in its way quite admirable) ambiguity of expression, the article clearly stipulates that Korea’s reunification will differ from all the preceding examples of Vietnam, Yemen and Germany in being a gradual, step-by-step affair, and that the initial stage will be some kind of a commonwealth or ‘union of states’ in which each side will retain most of the functions of a central government. Pyongyang prefers to call this a ‘low-level federation’, but there is every indication that its first priority is preservation of DPRK as an independent entity and, even after security guarantees by the U.S. and other powers, it will at best settle for a quite loose confederation, (which in fact is the word used in its official translation of the proposed Koryo Democratic Confederal Republic.) But there is another essential feature of this Korean-style reunification that the two political leaders may or may not have bargained for. When reunification is made into an extended, many-staged process, there inevitably opens up a space for civic participation, which the civilian sectors (including business corporations) of South Korea, at any rate, are ready to fill. If such participation does its work, it will even define to a large extent when and how the authorities on the two sides could or should proclaim a union or confederation. In other words, such a formal proclamation will amount in large part to a post-facto ratification of what people on the ground have worked out through political, economic, social, cultural contacts and exchanges. And let me assure you that since the June 15 Joint Declaration this process has never really stopped, not even in the darkest days of nuclear crisis. I will conclude by trying to answer two questions. First, even if a confederal structure comes into place, will such a union-probably much looser than the European Union in its current state-deserve to be called reunification? I say yes because we are operating in a completely different historical context, where, unlike the already unified nation-states of Europe moving toward a closer union, a forcibly divided nation with a long history of unified national life behind it will be taking an irreversible step toward recovery of its unity, and where the two sides will have devised for the first time a meaningful mechanism for managing a process far more explosive than anything in present-day Europe or the two Germanies of the past. But secondly, is reunification even in this peculiar sense feasible? An affirmative answer at least sounds less doubtful today than it did two or three months ago. Implications of a negative answer have also become much more dire since North Korea’s nuclear test. No doubt, it will take time to reach what I have called the twin goals of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula and normalization of DPRK-US relations, but for proponents of Korea’s ‘participatory reunification’ that is no great matter. For we can use the time to deepen people’s participation in the reunification process and thus help to build a more humane and democratic society in the Korean peninsula. □
[Bill McKibben] How Close to Catastrophe?

November 30, 2006

How Close to Catastrophe? Bill McKibben is an American environmentalist and writer who frequently writes about global warming, alternative energy, and the risks associated with human genetic engineering. He is a frequent contributor to The New York Review of Books, Outside, and The New York Times. His first book, The End of Nature (1989) sounded one of the earliest alarms for a general audience about global warming. * The Korean translation of this article was published in the Quarterly Changbi (Winter 2006). © Bill McKibben 2006
[Tessa Morris-Suzuki] Repatriation and the Politics of Humanitarianism…

September 6, 2006

Tessa Morris-Suzuki TESSA MORRIS-SUZUKI is a professor at the research school of Pacific and Asian studies at the ANU * The Korean translation of this article was published in The Quarterly Changbi(Autumn 2005). © Tessa Morris-Suzuki 2005 —————————————————————————————————————————————————————————— From War to Cold War In May 1945, as the battle for Okinawa raged with terrible loss of life, US President Truman received a puzzling message from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS – the forerunner of today’s CIA). An OSS agent in Portugal had been contacted on May 7, via an intermediary, by Inoue Masutarô, Counsellor of the Japanese Legation in Lisbon, Portugal, of course, was a neutral nation with close links to the Axis powers, and for this reason was the site of some of the more unconventional intelligence activities of the Second World War. [1] The message from Inoue Masutarô, passed on to the OSS and ultimately to President Truman, was this: “The Japanese are ready to cease hostilities, provided they are allowed to retain possession of their home islands. Inoue stressed American and Japanese ‘common interests’ against the USSR. He said, though, that unconditional surrender would not be acceptable to Japan.” [2] Soon after, Inoue again expressed his desire to meet an American official for discussions about the possibilities of a Japanese surrender. “On this occasion”, according to the OSS, “Inoue declared that actual peace terms were unimportant so long as the term ‘unconditional surrender’ was not employed. [3] This shadow diplomacy was just one of a number of tentative attempts by officials of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to explore the possibility of surrender in the months leading up to Japan’s defeat in the Asia-Pacific War. In the first half of 1945, contact was also being established with the US via the Vatican, Switzerland, Sweden and the Soviet Union. For most historians, the story is significant above all because these peace feelers raise profound questions about one of the most passionately debated issues of the twentieth century: the claim that the use of atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was justified as the only way of bringing about a Japanese surrender. [4] The Lisbon story, however, also sheds interesting light on another important, but much less well-known, piece of twentieth century history: the repatriation of Zainichi Koreans from Japan to North Korea from 1959 onward. For Lisbon Embassy Counsellor Inoue Masutarô was to re-emerge in the 1950s as the central figure in that story. The “peace feelers” extended to the US and Britain were largely initiated by a group within the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs associated with Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru, and his younger close associate Okazaki Katsuo (head of the Foreign Ministry’s Investigation Bureau – Chôsakyoku – at the end of the Pacific War). [5] Inoue appears to have been linked to this group via Okazaki, who was his senior at Tokyo University during his student days. Shigemitsu and Okazaki shared recognition of the USSR as the major threat to Japan, and saw negotiated surrender to the USA, as a means of forestalling subjugation by the Soviet Union. Although Inoue served in diplomatic posts in Belgium, the US, Poland, Yugoslavia and Portugal, an important part of his prewar work focused on East Asian Communism. In the early 1930s he had served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Asia Bureau Section 2, where one of his main roles was to conduct “research about the Chinese Communist Party”.[6] Reports compiled by the section during Inoue’s tenure of this post suggest that a related target of that research were left-wing Korean guerilla groups in Manchuria, some of which were later to form the core of the Kapsan Faction in the political landscape of the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea. [7] One of the junior but rising members of this guerilla movement, interestingly enough, was a young man named Kim Song-Ju, soon to adopt the pseudonym Kim Il-Sung[8]. After Japan’s eventual and unconditional surrender in August 1945, Inoue returned to Tokyo where he put his prewar experience to good use, becoming one of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ leading experts on Asian Communism. In 1955 he retired from the Ministry and joined the Japan Red Cross Society as the head of its Foreign Affairs Section. However, his extraordinary career in the Red Cross was inseparably linked to his long experience as a Foreign Ministry official with close links to the Japanese intelligence community. Seen in the context of his previous and subsequent career, Inoue’s brief appearance on the stage of Pacific War diplomacy is significant above all because it symbolizes the link between Japan’s prewar colonial expansion and the postwar politics of the Cold War era. And this link, in turn, is crucial to understanding the forces that led to the mass repatriation to North Korea. Okazaki Katsuo (by then a Liberal Democratic Party politician) was one of the ruling party members who initiated a policy of support for repatriation; Shigemitsu Mamoru, as Foreign Minister in the mid-1950s, enthusiastically endorsed the policy; and Inoue Masutarô, as Head of the Japan Red Cross Society’s Foreign Affairs Section, played the central role in putting the policy into effect. It was fear of that greater evil – the threat of Communist expansion in Asia – that encouraged some members of the Japanese elite to contemplate the possibility of a negotiated surrender to the lesser evil, the United States. This “common interest” between Japan and the US made it easy for colonial experience to be transferred smoothly to the postwar environment of the emerging Cold War. In other words, it encouraged the survival of colonial attitudes in the postwar world, and the melding of these attitudes into the new ideologies of Cold War Asia. All of this was to become most vividly evident in the repatriation story. Repatriation and the Cold War Order The history of the repatriation, which led to the resettlement of 86,603 Zainichi Koreans, together with 6,731 Japanese and 6 Chinese spouses or dependents[9], from Japan to North Korea between 1959 and 1984, casts light on three crucial features of Northeast Asia’s Cold War history. The first feature, as we have seen, was the formative influence of legacies from the Japanese prewar empire on the Cold War order. The Cold War in Asia, it might be said, was always haunted by the un-exorcised ghosts of colonialism. Secondly, the Cold War era was both an age of ideological conflict between capitalist and communist camps and, at the same time, the age of the apotheosis of nationalism. In the repatriation story, notions of national or ethnic belonging became intricately entangled with concepts of political loyalty or subversion. Thirdly, the repatriation story reminds us of the crucial role played by international organizations and NGOs in the Cold War order. Organizations like the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross provided channels of communication and mediation between the hostile camps of communism and capitalism. But they also provided a forum in which the Cold War superpowers and their allies sought to enhance their prestige and win support from the non-aligned by appearing in the role of good “global citizens”. For this reason, it sometimes became very difficult to prevent the humanitarian motives of international bodies from being exploited by governments on both sides of the Cold War for their own political ends. To explore the way in which these Cold War forces shaped the history of repatriation, I shall try to map the approaches to the issue taken by the political establishments of three countries: Japan, the Soviet Union and North Korea. Needless to say, other countries – most notably South Korea and the United States – also played important parts in the story. In addition, repatriation was supported on the Japanese side not just by some members of the political establishment but also, of course, by the Communist and Socialist Parties and wide sections of the media and public opinion. For reasons of space, however, I shall mention these roles only briefly, and focus instead on the political establishments in the three countries which seem to me to have been most influential in determining the course of events. Even within this limited scope, it becomes possible to see the extraordinary way in which the deeply personal decisions of tens of thousands of people to decide where to live their lives became caught up in a far-reaching web of Cold War politics whose ramifications the returnees themselves could never have imagined. The Japanese Government and “Repatriation by Remote Control” The first serious moves towards a mass repatriation of Zainichi Koreans to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) occurred in latter part of 1955, and the main initiative came from Japan. 1955 was, of course, the year when both the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the North Korean-affiliated General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Sôren) were founded. The creation of Sôren marked an important shift away from the policy pursued by its predecessor, the United Democratic Front of Koreans in Japan (Zainichi Chôsenjin Tôitsu Minshu Sensen), which had worked closely with the Japanese Communist Party in advocating revolution within Japan. By contrast, Sôren defined Koreans in Japan as citizens of the DPRK, whose task was to work for the development and reunification of their homeland, rather than involving themselves in Japanese politics. As a long and intriguing article published in the Asahi Shimbun on 2 July 1955 makes clear, Japanese intelligence and security officials were well aware of this shift in Zainichi Korean politics, which they appear to have seen in a positive light.[10] Interestingly enough, this article was published side-by-side with an announcement of the appointment of former diplomat and Foreign Ministry expert on Communism Inoue Masutarô to the directorship of the Foreign Affairs Section of the Japan Red Cross Society, a body which (as the Asahi noted) was sometimes regarded as filling the role of a “second Foreign Ministry”.[11] It seems reasonable to surmise that it was around this time that members of the Japanese political and bureaucratic establishment became interested in the prospect of a mass repatriation of Koreans to North Korea. The reasons for Japanese official support of a mass repatriation movement were spelled out by Inoue Masutarô with startling clarity during a conversation with William Michel, an official of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on an official visit to East Asia, in May 1956. Inoue reportedly informed the ICRC representative of the following points: “1. A total absence of humanitarian considerations in relation to the entire Korean problem in Japan. 2. The desire of the Japanese government to rid itself of several tens of thousands of Koreans who are indigent and vaguely communist, thus at a stroke resolving security problems and budgetary problems (because of the sums of money currently being dispensed to impoverished Koreans). 3. According to Mr. Inoue, the Japanese government is said to have decided to undertake repatriation, if necessary by provoking individual demands to go to the North. (This seems to me to have rather large and serious consequences.)”[12] But (as Inoue went on to explain) to conceal these motives and to avoid antagonizing the South Korean government, the Japanese government decided to pursue its objectives through the intermediary of a supposedly apolitical and humanitarian NGO – the International Red Cross. They wished, in other words, to carry out a kind of “repatriation by remote control”, so that mass return to North Korea would be achieved without it appearing as though the Japanese authorities were instigators of the project Exactly how the government intended to “provoke individual demands” for repatriation to the North was not explained. However, it should be noted that, precisely when Inoue’s conversation with Michel was taking place, the Ministry of Health and Welfare was conducting an energetic campaign to slash the very limited welfare benefits available to Koreans in Japan. Some 70,000 Zainichi Koreans had their welfare payments either reduced or cancelled: a move which undoubtedly made the prospect of life in North Korea look more attractive than it would otherwise have seemed.[13] Japanese pressure on the ICRC resulted in a memorandum, issued on 26 February 1957 by the Leopold Boissier, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross on the prompting of the Japan Red Cross Society’s Shimazu Tadatsugu. The memorandum set out the ICRC’s agreement in principle that, if the Japanese and North Korean governments and Red Cross Societies could reach a satisfactory agreement about repatriation, the ICRC was willing to send a mission to Japan to “verify the freely expressed will” of returnees.[14] The South Korean government, which was aware that moves were afoot to carry out repatriation to North Korea, reacted with intense anger, insisting that all Koreans in Japan were citizens of the Republic of Korea and threatening reprisals. As a result, the Japanese government’s moves on the repatriation issue were cautious. In September 1957, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke suggested to the Japanese Red Cross that it should encourage the ICRC to counteract South Korean objections to repatriation by “insisting on the humanitarian character of the problem”.[15] In response to Kishi’s suggestion, the Japanese Red Cross drew up a resolution on the “reunion of displaced persons” which was put to the International Conference of the Red Cross in New Delhi, and passed unanimously as the Conference’s Resolution 20 on 29 October 1957. From then on, Resolution 20 was repeatedly invoked to generate international support in persuading South Korea to acknowledge the “humanitarian” nature of mass repatriation to North Korea. This may seem a little curious, since over 97% of Zainichi Koreans originated from the southern half of the Korean Peninsula and hardly any actually had families living in North Korea. However, as Inoue Masutarô explained in a message to other national Red Cross Societies, “the whole Korean Peninsula is the ‘home’ of the Koreans residing in Japan in the meaning of Resolution No. 20 of the New Delhi Conference.”[16] Of course, the Japanese authorities alone could not have created a mass repatriation movement. The enthusiastic participation of others was needed. Within Japanese society itself, these included the Japanese media and North Korean affiliated General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Sôren). Externally, they included above all the North Korean and Soviet governments. Sôren embarked on a mass campaign to promote repatriation some two-and-a-half years after the first moves by the Japanese government, in August 1958. Rallies and marches were held across the country; education campaigns on repatriation were held in Sôren affiliated schools; the Association’s newspaper Chôsen Sôren, which until then had focused mainly on news from North Korea and on the welfare problems of Koreans in Japan, began to run front page stories in almost every issue highlighting the wonderful prospects which awaited returnees in the Fatherland. This campaign clearly had the blessing of the North Korean government, which issued a series of statements on repatriation, including an announcement by Foreign Minister Nam Il on 8 September 1958 that the Democratic People’s Republic would provide the means necessary for returnees to settle into new lives in the Fatherland. The Soviet Intervention Before looking more closely at the North Korean government’s reasons for supporting mass repatriation, I should like to consider another crucial, but so far relatively neglected, part of the story: the involvement of the Soviet Union. According to the Soviet Ambassador in Pyongyang, soon after the arrival of the first repatriation ship North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung expressed his personal gratitude to the USSR, stating that “The Soviet sailors worked magnificently. As far as he [Kim] was aware, the [repatriation] vessels had been protected by Japanese naval forces while in Japanese waters and by Soviet naval forces in neutral waters. The government of the DPRK heartily thanks the government of the Soviet Union for the immense support and help, provided both during negotiations with the Japanese and in carrying out the repatriation”.[17] The Soviet connection in fact went back to 1956, when the Japan Red Cross Society had approached the Soviet Union about the possibility of using one of its ships for repatriation. At that time, the USSR turned down the request, because normal commercial relations with Japanese had not yet been established and there were no regular shipping links between the two countries. However, as Inoue Masutarô later noted, the approach did result in an important commitment from the USSR: “the Soviet representative promised me to carry North Koreans if the lines be established.[18] Because of gaps in the Russian archival material, it is not possible to be certain exactly when the Soviet government agreed to support the repatriation process, but it seems likely that some sort of unofficial agreement at leats had been reached before Nam Il’s public announcement of 8 September 1958. One indication of the Soviet Union’s support became evident the following month, when an interesting change of personnel took place at the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo: the former Ambassador to Beijing was appointed to head the embassy in Japan, while the prominent Soviet North Korea expert and former Chargé d’Affairs in Pyongyang S. P. Suzdalev became Counsellor in the Tokyo Embassy. On his arrival, Suzdalev promptly approached to Japanese government to urge it to accept North Korea’s offer to receive Korean repatriates from Japan. Reporting these developments to the ICRC, Inoue Masutarô observed, “This incident proves that the North Korean government has already made contact with the USSR government and, therefore, I think, if the matter should be brought up officially, the Soviet government would accept the repatriation of Koreans by Soviet ships.”[19] The Soviet Union indeed provided not only the ships and other crucial material assistance for repatriation, but also vital input into the negotiation process. In February 1959, Japan’s cabinet announced its willingness to approve and assist a mass repatriation scheme. Since the Japanese government had kept its earlier repatriation moves confidential, it was able to present this announcement as a purely “humanitarian” response to the upsurge of demands from within the Zainichi Korean community. From this point on, both Japanese and North Korean sides publicly supported repatriation. Nevertheless, misunderstanding and mistrust between the Japanese and North Korean sides remained profound, and the North Korean Red Cross failed to respond to a request from Inoue Masutarö that it should send a delegation to Geneva for negotiations on repatriation. It was the Soviet Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies that stepped in to break the deadlock. On 5 March 1959, Inoue Masutarô of the Japan Red Cross Society met the Soviet Red Cross Director General Tchikalenko in Geneva to work out some possible ground rules for a repatriation accord. Inoue and Tchikalenko reached general consensus on the proposition that the ICRC should supervise the repatriation program within the frontiers of Japan, but would have no involvement in the transport of returnees or their processing and settlement in North Korea.[20] The North Korean side, however, remained unconvinced. They were mistrustful both of the Japanese government and of the Japanese Red Cross, and there were clearly deep divisions within the DPRK political establishment about the best response to the situation. At this point, the USSR began to pressure North Korea for a swift and positive decision on repatriation. On March 14, Ambassador Puzanov held discussions with the North Korean Foreign Minister in which he “insistently tried to show to Nam Il that a delay in sending a letter [of reply to the Japan Red Cross Society] and a delegation for negotiations would be exploited by forces inimical to the DPRK”.[21] Why was the Soviet Union so eager to promote the repatriation of Koreans from Japan to North Korea: a project which had no obvious connection to its own national interests? The answer lies deeply embedded in the Cold War politics of the late 1950s. The years from 1956 to 1958 were a time of profound instability and change within the Communist bloc. Following the advent of the Khrushchev regime and the start of de-Stalinization, signs were emerging of an impending Sino-Soviet split. Meanwhile, Khrushchev was embarking on major new international relations initiatives, including fresh approaches towards the US and the United Nations, and was eager to obtain the support of North Korea and other communist countries. At the same time, Soviet influence within North Korea itself faced a crisis. In August 1956, inspired by Soviet de-Stalinization, a group of would-be reformers within the ruling Korean Workers’ Party attempted to challenge Kim Il-Sung’s authority and his growing personality cult. Most of the key figures in the group were members of the pro-Chinese Yan’an Faction, but some were Soviet-Korean returnees. Kim Il-Sung, forewarned of the challenge, succeeded in defeating his opponents, several of whom fled across the border to China or Russia. At first it seemed as though major purges had been avoided. However, Kim Il-Sung had merely chosen to bide his time. From the middle of 1957 purges of those seen as being associated with the “August Group” began, directed first at the Yan’an Faction and then, from the end of 1957, increasingly at the Soviet Koreans.[22] In response to this political climate, many prominent Soviet Koreans sought asylum in the USSR and some students receiving training in the USSR expressed reluctance to return home. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union began a significant reduction in the number of advisors and technical experts whom it sent to North Korea as part of its aid program.[23] In the unstable political climate of the late 1950s, the USSR was extremely anxious to shore up its damaged relationship with North Korea. Providing help with the repatriation program was (from the Soviet perspective) an ideal way to do this. Loaning ships for the repatriation was a relatively cheap and simple way to provide a fresh inflow of technical experts, and involvement in the repatriation program could also help the USSR to strengthen ties with Japan at a time when it was eager to promote trade between the resource-rich Soviet Far East and the expanding Japanese economy. Most crucially of all (as we shall see) the scheme fitted perfectly with the new role which the USSR was seeking to carve out for itself in the international community and particularly the United Nations. The North Korean Initiative There has long been debate as to why the DPRK agreed, not only to welcome such a large and sudden inflow of people, but also to provide them with housing, jobs, education and welfare. Of course, North Korea had shown an interest in repatriation from Japan well before 1958. Nam Il himself had raised the matter in a long message on the subject of Zainichi Koreans, which had been forwarded to the Japanese Red Cross by its North Korean counterpart as early as December 1955, and a small number of Zainichi Koreans (about 50) had in fact been repatriated in 1956-1957.[24] At that stage, however, it is clear that the interest of the North Korean government was focused on two quite small groups of people: first, Zainichi Korean students who had studied at Sôren affiliated schools and now wanted to continue their education at colleges in the DPRK; and second, internees held in Ômura Migrant Detention Centre. This second group consisted of people awaiting deportation to Korea. At that time, all deportees were sent to the South, regardless of their political views or personal wishes, a policy which was passionately contested both by Sôren and by the North Korean government.[25] Nam Il’s December 1955 message discussed these small groups of returnees in the context of a wider North Korean initiative to improve the education and living conditions of the Korean community within Japan itself. Interestingly enough, one reason for this initiative was the fact that Foreign Minister Nam saw the Zainichi Korean community as a potential channel of communication to South Korea.[26] I have found no evidence that the North Korean government was seriously considering a mass repatriation from Japan at that point. But from late 1957 onward, several events occurred which made repatriation seem particularly attractive. The first, as we have seen, was the problem of the Soviet-Korean faction, the crisis in relations with the USSR and the reduction in the scale of Soviet technical assistance. A second important issue was the phased withdrawal of some 300,000 Chinese “volunteers” who had come to North Korea to support its military effort during the Korean War, and stayed on to assist in reconstruction. A mass repatriation of Koreans from Japan would obviously have helped to relieve the shortage of labour and military manpower caused by this withdrawal. But the repatriation plan was not motivated purely by economic concerns. From the point of view of the North Korean government, the withdrawal of Chinese “volunteers” created, not only problems of labour shortage but also, more importantly, strategic problems. Since US troops remained in South Korea, there were grave fears in the North about a drastic shift in the military balance on the Peninsula when the Chinese withdrew. To counter this, the North Korea and the USSR attempted to take a major new initiative on Korean re-unification which, they hoped, would win support for the DPRK in the international community. On 5 February 1958, the Kim Il-Sung regime put forward a proposal for a complete withdrawal of foreign troops from the Korean Peninsula, to be followed by internationally supervised elections in both North and South. At the same time, the DPRK intensified its lobbying efforts to win international support, particularly within the General Assembly of the United Nations. Repatriation was a key element in this campaign for international understanding and sympathy. The mass “voluntary” return of Koreans, most of whom originated in the South of the Peninsula, was a huge propaganda coup for the DPRK. This point was made plain by Foreign Minister Nam Il and by Kim Il-Sung himself. At a meeting with Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Mikoyan in Moscow in 1959, Nam Il reported, with obvious satisfaction, that “the emergence of the repatriation issue had brought political gains to the DPRK, while Syngman Rhee had lost out. He is not only unable to accept [returnees] to South Korea, but on the contrary is prepared to export unemployed people from South Korea to Latin America.”[27] The following year, as the Japanese and North Korean Red Cross Societies were debating the extension of the repatriation agreement, Kim Il-Sung remarked that whether or not the agreement was continued “the fact of the repatriation of more than 30,000 Koreans from Japan to the DPRK had given us a major victory in international politics”.[28] To reinforce the benefits, North Korea prepared special information on the repatriation which it sent to the Soviet mission to the UN for distribution to delegates to the 1960 General Assembly meeting.[29] Nam’s discussion with Mikoyan suggests a further reason for North Korea’s growing enthusiasn for repatriation from Japan. During their meeting, Nam observed “we want to develop trade with Japan, but the Japanese government hinders this, whereas Japanese firms display interest in trade with the DPRK and often visit the DPRK via China”.[30] After returning from the negotiations in Geneva, Yi Il-Gwon (the head of the North Korean Red Cross delegation at the talks) reported that “a broad section of the Japanese population and even some members of the Liberal Democratic Party and Governors of prefectures support the efforts of the Koreans for repatriation”.[31] This impression of strong Japanese support was reinforced when Yi travelled to Niigata in the first repatriation ship in December 1959. The conclusion he drew from the enthusiastic welcome he had received in Japan was that “the Japanese population, and even the Japanese police, are on the side of the DPRK. All steps were taken by the Japanese authorities to prevent provocation on the part of pro-Syngman Rhee elements. The repatriation has the support of Japanese society”.[32] Repatriation would have seemed to the North Korean government a promising way of influencing Japanese opinion, both public and official, and thus of opening up the possibility of closer economic and political ties with Japan. This was of particular importance at a time when the DPRK was not only engaged in an unceasing battle with the ROK for international support and sympathy, but was also in the process of developing a more independent stance in relation to China and the Soviet Union. Conclusion It is clear that, at the time of the repatriation movement, many thousands of people genuinely chose to “return” to North Korea. Some were motivated by powerful political beliefs; some hoped for a bright future in the DPRK; others were less optimistic, but left out of fears that they and their children and grandchildren would never find real acceptance in Japan; some were driven by poverty and joblessness; others rather reluctantly followed husbands or parents to this unfamiliar “homeland”. The questions which must be posed are these: in making their “free choice”, what alternatives did they have to choose between? What information were they given about these choices, and how did others seek to manipulate the decisions which were made? The repatriation story which we have traced has major implications for the present. For one thing, it had a decisive and often tragic influence on the lives of tens of thousands of people. For another, it has significant implications for the contemporary issue of the exodus of refugees from North Korea. Today too there can be no doubt that many thousands of people wish to leave North Korea for political, economic and other reasons. The cross-border movement of people from North Korea is a crucial issue for the governments of the region. However, just as in the case of the repatriation movement, so too contemporary responses of governments to the North Korean refugees’ issue, genuinely humanitarian problems are being utilized for political ends. On example of this process is the US North Korea Human Rights Act of October 2004. Japanese North Korea researcher Shigemura Toshimitsu, observes that the US aim in introducing the North Korea Human Rights Act is to ensure that “several thousand defectors leave [North Korea] every month. If defections increase to that level, the North Korean government will have no option but to deploy the People’s Army along the frontier to prevent them. But if the People’s Army is deployed, it can be anticipated that it will repeatedly open fire on defectors. If this develops into incidents involving bloodshed, it is possible that the people of the frontier area will revolt. America’s real aim is that such a revolt should spread to Pyongyang and bring about the collapse of the Kim Jong-Il regime.”[33] Reading those words, I could not help being reminded of the Japanese government’s desire, in the mid-1950s, to “provoke individual demands” for repatriation. Now as then, the genuine human suffering is being subordinated to ulterior political interests. The plight of North Korean refugees is a pressing human rights issue. Thousands of refugees (including a number of people who themselves first went to North Korea as part of the repatriation movement) are now living precarious existences in Northeast China; many of the 6000 or so who have been resettled in South Korea face large problems of social adjustment. Those who leave the DPRK do so for a wide range of reasons: in search of political freedom; to earn a little money to feed their families; to trade; to seek better opportunities for their children. The sufferings which many face stir genuine humanitarian feelings. The question is how to address the humanitarian issues while remaining clear-headed about the complex politics which are often at work behind the rhetoric of “human rights”. Against this background, it is particularly important for those who are deeply alarmed by the ideological underpinnings of the US North Korea Human Right Act to put forward alternative approaches to addressing the human needs of refugees and other emigrants. These alternatives need to be truly regional in scope, to address the long-term interests of migrants, and to take into account the complex interconnection of many sorts of migratory movement within and from the Korean Peninsula, including the very large contemporary internal migration of people within North Korea. They need to recognise the diversity and individuality of those who cross the border, without trying to impose on them the simple homogenising label of “economic migrants”, “political defectors” etc. Alternative approaches are essential to prevent humanitarian emotions from becoming the tool of belligerent politics. But they are also, and above all, essential to ensure that the people who cross frontiers are not, yet again, treated as the disposable pawns of strategic power-plays this, the final painful chapter of the Cold War. [The Quarterly Changbi, Autumn 2005] * A version of this paper was presented to the conference Coexistence on the Korean Peninsula and Cooperation in the Northeast Asia Region, University of Tokyo, 24 May 2005. —————————————————————————————————————————————————————————— [1] These included a notorious incident in which over-enthusiastic OSS officers broke into the Japanese embassy in Lisbon and stole its code books, to the distress of their superiors, since the venture simply encouraged the Japanese to increase the security of their diplomatic ciphers. See Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of the CIA, New York, Basic Books, 1983. [2] “Memorandum for the President”, 31 May 1945, in Memoranda for the President: Japanese Feelers, compilation of documents approved for release under the CIA historical review program, 22 September 1993, see http://www.cia.gov/csi/kent_csi/docs/v09i3a06p. [3] Ibid. [4] See for example Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam – The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power, London and East Haven, Pluto Press, 1994. The first edition of this book was published in 1975. [5] On Shigemitsu’s role in relation to the peace feelers, see Shigemitsu Mamoru, Shôwa no Dôran (1952), reprinted in Shigemitsu Mamoru, Shigemitsu Mamoru Chosakushû, vol. 1, Tokyo, Hara Shobô, 1978. [6] “Nisseki gaijibuchô ni natta Inoue Masutarô”, Asahi Shimbun, 2 July 1955 ; see also Gaimushô Hyakunenshi Hensan Iinkai, Gaimushô no hyakunen, vol. 2, Tokyo, Hara Shobô, 1969, p. 1544. [7] For example, Gaimushô Ajiakyoku Dainika, Saikin Shina oyobi Manshû Kankei Shomondai Tekiyô, December 1933, in Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives 1868-1945, SP series, reel 64 (held in National Library of Australia – mfm G5929). [8] See Bruce Cumings, North Korea: Another Country, New York, the New Press, 2004, pp. 109-112. [9] Kim Yongdal and Takayanagi Toshio eds., Kita Chôsen Kikoku Jigyô Kankei Shiryôshû, Tokyo, Shinkansha, 1995, p. 341. [10] “Zainichi Chôsenjin no dôkô: Chian tôkyoku no kenkai”, Asahi Shimbun, 2 July 1955. [11] “Nisseki gaijibuchô ni natta Inoue Masutarô”, Asahi Shimbun, 2 July 1955. [12] Michel to ICRC, 23 May 1956. In Archives of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva (hereafter ICRC Archives), file B AG 232 105-002. Problème du rapatriement des Coréens du Japon, dossier I : généralités, 17.2.1953-11.10.1957. [13] See for example Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 24 May 1956; Tokyo Shimbun, 24 May 1956, translations of articles in ICRC Archives, B AG 323 105-004, Problème du rapatriement des Coréens du Japon, dossier III : rapatriement de 48 Coréens en Corée-du-Nord, 18.5.1956-03.12.1957. [14] Memorandum of 26 February 1957, attached as Annex 1 to Aide-Memoire by J-P Maunoir for the ICRC Plenary Session of 6 July 1959, “Rapatriement des Coréens du Japon en Corée du Nord”, p. 6, ICRC Archives, B AG 232 105-007, Problème du rapatriement des Coréens du Japon, dossier VI : Accord entre la Société de la Croix-Rouge du Japon et la Société de la Croix-Rouge de la République démocratique populaire de Corée du 24 juin 1959 et pétitions, 29.01.1959-13.08.1959. [15] See French translation of letter from Kishi to Shimazu, 20 September 1957, forwarded by Shimazu to Boissier, 1 October 1957, ICRC Archives, B AG 232 105-005. 01, Problème du rapatriement des Coréens du Japon, dossier II, (Copies pour information transmises par la Croix-Rouge japonaise), 16.01.1956-18.12.1957. [16] Inoue Masutarô, “Why is the Question of Repatriation an Urgent Humanitarian Issue?”, document for circulation to national Red Cross Societies, 29 January 1959, p. 4, in Archives of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Geneva, file no. 22/3/4, Coréens au Japon. [17] Dnevnik posla SSSR v KNDR A. M. Puzanova za period s 8 po 18 dekabrya 1959 g., entry for 16 December (emphasis added), in in Joongang Ilbo ed., ‘Pyongyang’ Jooje Soryeon Daesagwan Bimil Moonseocheok, Seoul, Joongang Ilbo 2002, available on database at subscribing institutions at www.kdatabase.com, file 59-3-3. [18] Inoue Masutarô, “Report:Visit to the the Ômura Detention Camp, June 28, 1958″, 1 July 1958, p. 8, in ICRC Archives, file no. B AG 232 105-006.01, Problème du rapatriement des Coréens du Japon, dossier VIII : année 1958 (Généralités) , 01.01.1958-15.12.1958. [19] Letter from Inoue to Gallopin, 31 October 1958, in ICRC Archives, file no. B AG 232 105-006.04. [20] Dnevnik posla SSSR v KNDR A. M. Puzanova za period s 21 yanvara po 24 marta 1959 g., entry for 10 March 1959, file 59-2-2. [21] Ibid; entry for 14 March 1959. [22] Andrei Lankov, Crisis in North Korea: The Failure of De-Stalinisation, 1956, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Pess, 2005, pp. 121-174. [23] Ibid., pp. 155 and 186-187. [24] See letter from Nam Il, attached to telegram from Li Byung Nam, Red Cross Society of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to Shimazu Tadatsugu, President of the Japan Red Cross Scoeity, 31 December 1955, p. 3, in ICRC Archives, file B AG 232 105-002. [25] Annex 4 to Déroulement de la Visite des Délégues du CICR à la République Democratique Populaire de Corée”, 5-12 April 1956, p. 4, in ICRC Archives, file B AG 232 105-002. [26] See Dnevnik posla SSSR v KNDR V. I. Ivanova za period s 29 sentabrya po 18 oktabrya 1955 g. , entry for 1 October, file 55-2-2. [27] “Zapis’ besedy A. I. Mikoyana s zamestitelem presedatelya kabineta ministrov i ministrom inostranyx del KNDR Nam Ilom 28 yulya 1958 goda”, p. 8, file 59-1-3. [28] Dnevnik posla SSSR v KNDR A. M. Puzanova za period s 29 iyunya po 8 avgusta 1960 g., entry for 24-26 July, file 60-1-1. [29] Dnevnik posla SSSR v KNDR A. M. Puzanova za period s 24 avgusta po 9 sentabrya 1960 g., entry for 2 September, file 60-1-2. [30] “Zapis’ besedy A. I. Mikoyana s zamestitelem presedatelya kabineta ministrov i ministrom inostranyx del KNDR Nam Ilom 28 yulya 1958 goda”, p. 4, file 59-1-3. [31] Dnevnik posla SSSR v KNDR A. M. Puzanova za period s 3 po 30 iyulya 1959 g., entry for 17 July. [32] Yi’s comments were reported to Ambassador Puzanov by newly appointed Foreign Minister Pak Song-Chol. See Dnevnik posla SSSR v KNDR A. M. Puzanova za period s 8 po 18 dekabrya 1959 g., entry for 18 December, file 59-3-3. [33] Shigemura Toshimitsu, “Hôi sareru Kim Jong-Il seiken ‘hôkai’ no kanôsei wa?”, Gekkan Gendai, February 2005, pp. 55-58, quotation from p. 55.
[Mark Selden] The Future of Korea: An Asia-Pacific Perspective

June 9, 2006

The Future of Korea: An Asia-Pacific Perspective By Mark Selden MARK SELDEN is a coordinator of Japan Focus, an electronic journal and archive on Japan and the Asia-Pacific at http://japanfocus.org. A Senior Fellow, East Asia Program, Cornell University, his research centers on modern and contemporary China and Japan and Asia, war and peace, the political economy of development, social movements, revolutionary change, regional formation, agrarian studies, and historical memory. He is the editor of book series at Rowman and Littlefield, Routledge, and M.E. Sharpe publishers. * The Korean translation of this article was published in the Quarterly Changbi (Autumn 2006). © Mark Selden 2006
[Suh Dong-man] Relationship between North and South Korea after the Ju…

June 5, 2006

Suh Dong-man Professor of Sangji University This article was printed in The Quarterly Changbi (Spring 2006) and translated by Korea Foundation later (see the webzine of Korea Foundation, KOREA FOCUS [http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/main_view.asp?volume_id=46&cate_code=A&g_cate_code=AA&g_code=101182]). © Suh Dong-man 2006 ————————————————————————————————————————————————————————– 1. The Historical Implication of the ‘June 15 Joint Declaration’ The relations between North Korea and South Korea have been steadily improved since the June 15 summit between President Kim Dae-jung and Chairman Kim Jong-il in the areas of exchanges and cooperation even though there have been ups and downs in the government-to-government relationship. In 2005, the two Koreas held civil and governmental ceremonies together to celebrate the anniversary of the June 15 summit and the August 15 Liberation Day. In the past, the North unified civil-government events on these anniversaries, while the South chose to separate civil ceremonies from government-sponsored activities. However, this time, exchanges and cooperation were made at the government-to-government, party-to-party, and people-to-people levels with equal attention and force. Just as the June 15 summit meeting was realized on the basis of the people’s democratic capabilities, the exchanges and cooperation have shown the democratic system in the South working to overcome the differences between the government and the civil society. On the other hand, the joint events signified the mitigation of the suspicion that the South Koreans have had about the North’s “Unified Front” strategy for the unification of Korea. The visit to the National Cemetery by the North Korean delegates visiting Seoul for the August 15 Ceremony was a symbolic act that reflected the status of South-North reconciliation. Despite the heightened conflicts between North Korea and the United States, the North Korean nuclear crisis is being dealt with at the “Six-Party Talks” with the increased cooperative relationship between the two Koreas working as a deterrent to the possible reliance on a military solution. The effect of the June 15 summit is being felt in North Korea as much as in the South. Since the June 15, 2000 summit, the North Korean economy has received substantive benefits from the bilateral exchanges and cooperation and also from the South Korean aid. This is no secret among North Koreans. The North Korean regime, which has been as vocal as South Korea for unification, must have faced pressure from the people to show progress in the North-South relationship. The so-called “June 15 spirit” is grandly propagated as the great product of Kim Jong-il’s unification policy and as the foundation of a new North-South relationship replacing the framework under the previous Kim Il-sung regime. The phrase “among us (North and South) as a nation,” used in the North as the core slogan of the “June 15 spirit,” seems to have been produced by softening the concept of “independence” and then combining it with the idea of “grand national unity” in the three principles of “Independence, Peace and Grand National Unity” declared in the July 4, 1972 Joint Communique. This demonstrated the change in North Korea’s acceptance of South Korea as a partner, departing from the perception as an outsider, a colony of external force, and a regime to destroy to realize “anti-colonial independence.” The phrase “grand national unity” used in the North also embodies the meaning of “reconciliation and cooperation” used by the South. This signifies an increased flexibility on the part of the North from the past policy line of “independence first, national unity later” to a flexible approach of simultaneous pursuit for the two goals or the reversed policy of “national unity first and independence later.” North Korea has finally realized the need to recognize the existence of South Korea and seek its assistance, despite the current North Korea-U.S. confrontation and South Korea-U.S. alliance. “Among us as a nation” certainly denotes a change in the North Korean concept on inter-Korean relations but “independence” still is the North’s main strategic line that can come up to the front at any time. Thus, it is premature to be totally optimistic about change in the North Korean attitude. In South Korea, the June 15 summit triggered diverse discussions on how to define the inter-Korean relationship, and the June 15 anniversary ceremony in 2005 intensified the debate. Some people even suggest that the June 15 summit marked the end of the age of separation and the beginning of the era of unification, based on the agreement in the Joint Declaration, which recognized the similarity between the commonwealth system proposed by the South and the low level of federation favored by the North. 2. Progress and Setback in Inter-Korean Relations The progress in inter-Korean relations of the past five years have been so substantial that some people point to June 15, 2000 as a turning point, a watershed between the old and new regimes. However, the South-North ties still show limitations in many areas. That is, there is still a long way to go along the road to peace and unification of the Korean Peninsula. Considering that the global Cold War has ended, many tasks that should have been achieved by now have not yet been accomplished. Even though the improvement in inter-Korean relations based on reconciliation and cooperation certainly signifies progress in the context of history, a counteraction that could lead to a setback is always possible. There is the “theory of divided system” which argues that even though reconciliation and cooperation between South Korea and North Korea have increased after the demise of the Cold War, it has also created an unstable condition on the Korean Peninsula. It points out the limit of the one-dimensional approach of looking at the reconciliation and cooperation between the two Koreas as a progress from the contradiction of the Cold War and national division of Korea. The current North Korean nuclear crisis demonstrates how an unsettled and postponed task that should have been accomplished at a certain historical point is negatively impacting relations. In fact, the fundamental cause of the North Korean nuclear crisis is the conflict between North Korea and the United States and between North Korea and Japan, which have been left unsettled since after the end of the Cold War. During the Roh Tae-woo administration, South Korea normalized diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and China, and gained the UN membership simultaneously with North Korea. On the other hand, North Korea in its foreign relationship did not overcome the Cold War confrontation with the United States and Japan. Furthermore, the economic crisis faced by North Korea also worked as the barrier to its economic transformation into launching a full-scale reform and liberalization program. The normalization of the North Korea-U.S., North Korea-Japan relationships was the historic task that should have been achieved in the late 1980s, and early 1990s at the latest. In the end the North Korean nuclear crisis emerged in 1992 and 1993, and has become the stumbling block against progress and improvement of the situation on the Korean Peninsula. The Korean situation, from the historical perspective, cannot be said to have progressed since the end of the Cold War. The advancement of South Korea alone in its foreign relations following the end of the Cold War between the East and the West does not automatically guarantee the development of the Korean Peninsula as a whole. Economic cooperation that dominates the inter-Korean relationship was the key product of the June 15 Summit. The current three major cooperation projects – Gaesong Industrial Complex, Mt. Geumgang tourism, and the linking of inter-Korean railroad and highway – are to be expanded to seven projects as the next stage of cooperation. They are energy cooperation, modernization of railroads, Mt. Baekdu tourism, modernization of Nampo port, reforestation, development of a joint agricultural complex, and the joint use of a border river. The new large-scale South-North economic cooperation projects are linked to North Korea’s economic reform and development. Going beyond unilateral assistance, they have been selected for their mutually beneficial and sustainable characteristics. However, cooperation in areas such as infrastructure, logistics and energy will be linked to the progress in the settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue to a certain degree. The proposed electricity assistance to North Korea, the core of inter-Korean economic cooperation, has been a pending issue between the two Koreas. However, the Kim Dae-jung government failed to settle the issue in the face of U.S. pressure. The Roh Moo-hyun government raised it within the framework of the six-party talks to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem. Seoul’s initiative only resulted in internationalization of the issue and the supply of 2 million KW of electricity to the North remains the major task of the times that should be realized as the follow-up measure to the June 15 summit. The North Korea-U.S. relationship since the South-North summit turned worse with the inauguration of the Bush administration, making the North Korea-U.S. joint declaration in 2000 that envisaged the normalization of the relationship and the peace arrangement a dead letter. Since then, the issues of easing military tension on the Korean Peninsula failed to move ahead. North Korea has only responded to the military talks at a working level when they are related to economic cooperation projects. The deadlock in North Korea-U.S. relations may be the direct cause, but the widening gap in military capabilities in South Korea’s favor seems to be of a great burden to North Korea. The changing shape of the South Korea-U.S. military alliance, involving Korea’s proposed recovery of the U.S. operational control of Korean forces in wartime, among others, also affects progress in inter-Korean military dialogues. In the meantime, the agreement at the first South Korea-U.S. strategic dialogue held on January 19, 2006, which recognizes the strategic flexibility of the U.S. Force in Korea, could cause concerns about a negative impact on the relations with North Korea and with China. There is a growing need to utilize the inter-Korean relationship to find a breakthrough on the nuclear issue. 3. Division, Peace, Unification Even without referring to the example of Germany, which has been suffering after-effects of unification, the majority of Koreans understand that an abrupt unification may bring disasters to both Koreas. The North Korean regime is not in any condition to sustain itself economically, and South Korea finds itself impotent in tackling with economic and social imbalances between the two Koreas. Therefore, unification should be managed with a long-term perspective. In addition, the two Koreas are still locked in military confrontation, and the Cold War regime has not been eliminated on the Korean Peninsula. The establishment of a peace regime is the foremost task. The long-term perspective does not mean that we should give up the goal of unification. Ironically, the German unification came when the two Germanys were unprepared for it with the sudden breakdown of East Germany and the demise of the global Cold War. The inter-Korean relationship at this moment has not even achieved the level of exchanges and cooperation that the two Germanys had accumulated before the unification. Koreans should stop emphasizing blindly that the settlement of peace must come before unification, and be careful not to make the same mistakes as Germans. In this regard, it is quite encouraging that the Law on the Development of South-North Relations, which was passed at the National Assembly in December 2005, mandates the government to draw up an overall policy plan for the development of North-South relations every five years. Setting up national policy agenda step by step with a long-term perspective to prepare for unification would mark a turning point to discard the old method, which was characterized by hurried pursuit of progress to satisfy immediate political needs, and seek a new approach for problem-solving. More than anything else, the June 15 Joint Declaration, which recognized the commonalities between South Korea’s “commonwealth” scheme and the “low level of federation” in North Korea’s unification process, is significant in view of the fact that the two sides identified common points from their formal unification policies and legalized discussions on unification. At least according to the text, the North Korean side divided its unification plan of “federation” into two stages and tried to come closer to South Korea’s “commonwealth.” Even though it is not expressed explicitly, South Korea seems to have taken into consideration the stage of “federal republic” from President Kim Dae-jung’s three-stage unification plan. Considering the heterogeneity of the two regimes that have existed for more than 60 years, whatever their achievements and negative aspects, instant unification into a single state may not be the best solution. Korea so far has mainly focused its discussion of unification on how to restore Korea as one nation, as was envisioned at the time of Korea’s liberation from the Japanese colonial rule. Now, Korea should include in its perspectives for unification even the unification as a nation of complex regimes such as a federal state. Recognizing the commonalities of the unification plan of the two Koreas was an epochal agreement in the June 15 Joint Declaration. The core implication of the agreement is that two Koreas will pursue unification gradually with a long-term perspective, and will individually develop to better status. If it is not for a unification that provides better condition than now, there is no need to rush for unification. The future of unification should be able to give both the northern and the southern regimes chances to exert their own individual potentials for further development. However, even if such perception is blocked by the reality of the North Korean regime which cannot but cling to its own survival, the argument by some progressive scholars that expecting unification is unrealistic and undesirable to either South or North is also a pessimistic and fatalistic attitude on the division of the Korean peninsula. The problem is that the current division is fundamentally unstable, and once the Cold War system on the Korean Peninsula, the external condition of the division, disappears, the current state of division cannot be maintained. It should also be noted that changing the status of division could paradoxically bring unrest to the division itself. In particular, the desire for unification that may burst out from the regimes in the South and the North in this process would be difficult to suppress with the passive approach of “division management.” The more realistic approach, on the contrary, is to respond with the approach of “unification as a process.” In this perspective, the improvement of the situation on the peninsula to a “good division” and a “better division” should be a preparatory process to prevent a “bad unification.” Peace is a precious value that should be pursued in the efforts to attain unification and is a task that should be persistently promoted. Peace has so far been regarded as the stage to be achieved in advance of unification. This was a common perception in Korea during the Cold War era when Korea tried to formulate the inter-Korean relationship modeled after the 1972 Framework Treaty between West Germany and East Germany. The establishment of the peace regime on the Korean Peninsula between the United States and South and North Korea should be the pre-condition before unification. However, peace, just like the “unification as a process,” must also be a “process” that should be achieved and developed by continuous efforts. Peace cannot be guaranteed in a situation where the 1991 South-North Basic Agreement cannot be implemented despite its detailed institutional plans. Even though the armistice arrangement is maintained on the peninsula, there has been no war for more than 50 years. Even though a comprehensive military dialogue has not been held since the June 16 summit, the peace on the peninsula has progressed remarkably with exchange programs and the three major economic cooperation projects underway. The territorial division is the result of a violent event called the Korean War, and now the inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation restores peace on the Korean Peninsula in the non-violent way. As is emphasized by the concept of “structural peace,” peace cannot be maintained under economic poverty and extreme social inequality. This applies to individual regimes as well as to the North-South relationship. North Korea’s economic crisis can be a greater threat to the peninsula and Northeast Asian region than its military force, which is a no match for South Korea’s. The North Korean nuclear issue is also directly linked to the crisis of the North Korean regime. At the six-party talks, there has been an understanding that the dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear facilities would lead to economic assistance from other parties. In this vein, the establishment of a peace regime, which is related with the reduction of the conventional armed force, will have to be considered for North Korea’s economic reconstruction. Enhancing peace based on the narrow definition of military and security terms could raise instability of the North Korean regime. The peace separated from exchanges and cooperation, and furthermore from the long-term unification process, is one-dimensional. A new approach is needed: not with the antiquated perception promoting “long-term peace settlement process as the stage prior to unification,” but from the new perception that the two processes could overlap. As North Korea and South Korea reached the stage in which they started to recognize each other’s regimes, different sectors – the government and non-government groups – must start building consensus on the rules and practices that will govern the South-North relationship. If the unification movement continues to neglect legitimate processes in building contacts and lines with the North Korean counterpart, it will lose broader domestic support. In order to gain public support in South Korea and gain momentum, the movement should go hand in hand in the direction of the current democratic progress in Korea. It is important that the two sides meet to build legal and customary processes similar to those applied between nations and improve them to be more democratic and institutionalized. However, when considering the establishment of a peace regime or North-South reconciliation, not to mention the unification in the longer term, finding the basis for North-South solidarity is the task that should not be neglected. Internationally, there once existed a class-solidarity based on the proletarian internationalism, but it lost its rationale. An international civil solidarity in the area of peace, environment and civil movement is emerging at present, but it would be difficult to find a corresponding force in North Korea considering its political, social and economic situation. In this sense, the North-South people’s solidarity emphasized in the “theory of divided system” may provide some insights, because it looks at the benefits to the people of North and South Korea as the criteria for solidarity. One of the links is the sense of identity as the “Korean race.” The “nationalism of the Korean peninsula” that pursues unification is the natural desire of the people in the current condition of “division.” While the negative aspects of nationalism are checked, the Korean nationalism should take an open form, because identities different from “ethnicity” that have evolved in the condition of separation – the North Korean “people” and the South Korean “nation” – must be mutually recognized. This is also because Koreans have complex identities that require realization of “coexistence in heterogeneity” along with the “expansion of homogeneity.” The identity of the Korean nation must be developed in the direction that embodies democracy and diversity. The identity of the North Korean people, however, will inevitably need major transformation as they begin to experience reform and market opening. South Korea’s national identity may expand to “grand Koreanism” that pursues unification by absorption, whereas the North Korean “nationalism” could shrink into the “Kim Il-sung nationalism.” Denying nationalism because of its negative aspect will only make this situation more likely to prolong. The best way to overcome the negative effects of nationalism is by attempting to create a sound and open nationalism. Nationalism for the Korean peninsula will be richer if both North and South Koreans can build a national community together over the whole peninsula and even invite Koreans living overseas in the four major countries – the United States, China, Japan and Russia. The creation of multi-lingual, multi-national Korean network would signal its efforts and directions for open nationalism. This can only be established with the region-wide cooperation in Northeast Asia, in peace and prosperity. 4. Development of Inter-Korean Cooperation for Co-Life The connection between the internal conditions of both Koreas and the territorial separation has been the subject of discussions from both “theory of divided system” and the “theory of confrontational co-existence.” It is generally accepted that North and South Korean regimes have been interdependent while confronting each other from the period of Cold War conflicts up to the early period of democratization. This aspect has become prominent in terms of the interrelation between democracy and division in South Korea, and interrelation between division and North Korea’s reform and liberalization. From the viewpoint of “divided system theory,” there has been an argument that the “system of division” was shaken by the progress of democracy in South Korea. South Korea’s developmental nation system that achieved the fastest economic success unprecedented in the world under the Cold War structure could no longer be sustained, and faced the financial crisis of 1997-98 by failing to undertake reform at the appropriate time. However no concrete causation has yet been scientifically analyzed. The problems facing South Korea or North Korea should not be all attributed to the separation alone. While admitting the unique structure and rationale of each regime, the effort to seek their interaction with the separation would be able to provide different perspectives for understanding the domestic problems from a broader perspective. Looking at the political terrain as well as the economic system, Korean nationalism has not yet overcome the “Cold War syndrome” and is still confined to the ideologically narrow mentality. In the meanwhile, South Korea was besieged heavily by “neo-liberalistic polarization.” Even though Korea boasts a trade volume as one of the world’s top 10 countries, its social welfare budget (6 percent) is less than one-third of the average of the OECD members, and thus remaining at the bottom rank. Yet, the power of progressive parties remains minimal, and Koreans still take sides with the public opinion against the arguments that are defined as socialist – that sound growth cannot be achieved without distribution, or that the welfare policy should be established to secure the minimum level of social safety net to prevent social polarization. This phenomenon cannot be understood without considering the current situation of division. It is hard to neglect the over-blown military, security sector compared to the weak social security system. The proportion of the military expenditure in the total GDP has greatly decreased with Korea’s economic growth, but it still takes a great proportion in the total national budget. The size is greater when the invisible security-related sector is taken into account. The situation is much more dreadful in North Korea, which still sacrifices the already-exhausted economy for huge military spending. North Korea’s national socialism has been strongly influenced by the situation of division. North Korean socialism has already become stagnant in the 1970s and through the 80s. However, it has obstinately refused to attempt any reform that requires adoption of market elements, and tried to overcome problems by strengthening the national-socialism ideology. The development of a superhuman ruling system, an extreme form of absolute despotism by leaders Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, should have its own rationale, but no doubt it is also influenced by the condition of division. The refusal to adopt market elements and the fear of it are two sides of a coin. Unlike China or Vietnam that have promoted reform and open-door policy since the 1980s, North Korea stayed behind, and thus had to face economic crisis with the fall of the Soviet Union and the East European socialist bloc, until it finally initiated a market-oriented reform in 2002. North Korea’s reform and market opening is inter-connected with the alleviation of the security threat from South Korea when the inter-Korean relations began to improve following the June 15 summit meeting in 2000. As the reconciliation and cooperation between the two Koreas move on the right track, inter-Korean relationship will increasingly become linked to the internal situations of the two parts. Therefore, the relationship needs to be pursued with clear intention, with more caution and preparation. Most of all for South Korea, the inter-Korean economic cooperation in the new stage would require a huge amount of financial resources for electricity supply or infrastructure building. The North Korean aid has also passed the stage of humanitarian assistance of clothes or food and reached the phase in which developmental assistance should expand to areas such as agricultural cooperation or development of consumer goods industry. However, for the South Korean government, while it has to start large-scale assistance and investment, it also faces the immediate task of meeting the huge welfare demand caused by internal socioeconomic polarization. While the Korean economy is suffering from the social polarization, it is in the state of “over supply of capital funds.” Around 400 trillion won is floating around the domestic market trying to find proper investment. The destructive impact from the rising real estate prices has demonstrated again that the Korean economy cannot advance by securing development demands through civil engineering and construction schemes. While the domestic imbalance, in which social polarization and capital oversupply co-exist, has emerged as the social ills doing harm to the development of Korean democracy, the economic imbalance on the Korean Peninsula could threaten peace too. As such, if the limitation of the domestic system caused by the division can only be overcome by the progress in inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation, the costs of cooperative programs, especially those for assistance and investment to North Korea, may also help create a favorable condition to increasing domestic social welfare budget. Investment opportunities in North Korea could be an outlet for South Korea’s oversupplied capital, which can promote simultaneous cooperative development of the two parts. There is a need for vision and policy that could accurately calculate and forecast how peace and welfare can interactively accelerate each other. It would be desirable to demonstrate the tangible and substantial spillover impacts of the reduction in security costs to the expansion of peace and welfare. In this sense, the inter-Korean military dialogue that would mitigate military threats from each other would work as the catalyst to economic cooperation. People need to understand and believe in their heart that this is the way to co-live, that they are pre-investing for unification, or paying the cost of unification, for the eventual unification in the long run. Even for North Korea that has cautiously moved forward to adopt market economy since the July 1, 2002 measure, its domestic reform will be closely related to the inter-Korean economic cooperation. South Korea’s food and fertilizer aid and economic cooperation projects have already taken up a significant proportion in North Korea’s domestic economic cycle. North Korea’s market-oriented reform can proceed only through economic cooperation as its development level remains at a very primitive stage. North Korea’s reform and market opening is directly related to China’s active investment in North Korea since 2004. South Korea’s capital must also play a substantial role in the early stage of market creation and development so that North Korea’s economic structure could in the long term integrate with South Korea. South Korea should prepare a sustainable development program for North Korea that would create profits from the investment of South Korea’s over-supplied capital to North Korea. In the early stage of South Korea’s economic development, the entry of Japanese capital following the normalization of diplomatic relations between Seoul and Tokyo played a decisive role in the creation of the Korean economic structure in the current form. This is the lesson to consider. As such, in Korea, peace, welfare, and a fresh leap in the next economic stage are interrelated and should be promoted together. And North Korea, in spite of the differences in the nature of the regimes and developmental levels, can take the right developmental path only when it works with South Korea. Under the current political terrain in South Korea, the reform-progressive political group will not gain majority support unless it becomes peace-progressive. The medium for such change is the consolidation of peace and welfare. But the progressive force will not be able to survive if that combination shows cleavage. It is time to prepare a policy that could create a feasible inter-Korean cooperation scheme with peace, welfare and development all combined. This signifies a creation of a common economic structure in which inter-Korean economic cooperation takes root in all major areas of domestic economies and continues expansion and reproduction. Already by the June 15 Declaration of 2000, the blueprint for the creation of the “iron silk road” through the reconnection of railroads and highways and the balanced development of the national economy has been laid out. This has expanded Korea’s political, economic, social and cultural space to the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia. From the perspective of the whole Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, the major task in the post-June 15 era is to look up to the respective reform and development of the two Koreas and seek areas for cooperation and undertake them. [The Quarterly Changbi ,Spring 2006]
[Lee Pil-Ryul] Environmental Movement Needs Urgent Reform to Overcome …

December 14, 2005

Lee Pil-Ryul Chairman of Center for Energy Alternative, Professor of Scientific History at Korean National Open University This article was printed in The Quarterly Changbi (Spring 2005) and translated by Korea Foundation later (see the webzine of Korea Foundation, KOREA FOCUS [http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/essays.asp?vol=&no=1114§ion=4&key=lee%20pil).] ). © Lee Pil-Ryul 2005 ——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————— Recently, I carefully reread the inaugural address that President Roh Moo-hyun delivered two years ago at his inauguration ceremony. The disappointment that I remembered feeling, as my initial reaction to this inauguration speech, seemed to now be intensified. My desire to reread the text of this speech was spurred on by the current nationwide disregard for our environment, which in turn led me to recall that President Roh had not mentioned a single word about environmental issues during his inaugural address. My memory was correct. The speech was filled with words that seemed to be associated with a pledge to focus all his efforts on economic growth. The word “sustainable,” which is frequently referred to in discourses on ecological matters, was mentioned once in the speech, but only to modify the following word “economic growth.” Nobody else may have paid much attention, but I think that the most telling aspect of the inaugural address was the mention of “sustainable economic growth.” This term summarizes the Roh Moo-hyun government’s amateurish approach to economic development. Did President Roh expect that the insertion of “sustainable” somewhere, without carefully distinguishing its proper placement, would somehow soothe public concerns about environmental problems? At that time, I sought to ease my disappointment with the inaugural speech by somehow blaming those involved with the environmental movement. I seemed to think that President Roh, who was elected by a people with high expectations for his reform initiatives, did not mention a single word about the environment because this meant that there was something wrong with the environmental movement, which had already been well established for over a decade. If the environmental movement, instead of focusing so intently on the struggle to resolve urgent regional environmental issues, had also made more efforts to introduce environmental matters into the mainstream of public discourse, the environment might not have been so utterly disregarded during the inaugural ceremony. Nowadays, politics in Korea are swayed by the whims of the electorate. As such, if even a small number of people push hard for a meaningful shift in policy based on environmental concerns, the political circles would have to take heed and respond accordingly. Therefore, the Roh Moo-hyun administration’s over-emphasis on economic affairs and neglect of environmental issues is a reflection of the Korean people’s mindset. Residents would like the environment in their region to be protected to some degree; however, they more highly value national development and continuous economic growth. In fact, most people still cling to a notion that growth is the answer to all our problems. In this regard, the usage of “sustainable economic growth” not only reinforces this growth notion, but also helps the public to maintain a false sense of assurance that something is being done about protecting the environment. Meanwhile, this fundamental situation has not been improved over the last two years. The Roh administration has not offered any compromise measures in regard to the development of nuclear waste disposal facilities, the Saemangeum reclamation project, or the construction of tunnels at Mt. Cheonseong and Mt. Sapae. Environmental organizations, which have focused their efforts on protesting such projects as these, have gradually come to be ignored by the public as well as the government. The government and these environmental organizations now find themselves at loggerheads over a number of environmental issues. And all this while, the government has refused to budge a single centimeter until a Buddhist nun’s hunger strike, to protest the construction of a tunnel at Mt. Cheonseong, reached a life-threatening stage, while on the other hand, the environmental organizations have declared the present state as an environmental emergency. ‘Environmental Emergency’ After having declared the existence of an environmental emergency in Korea, environmental organizations are now waging an all-out struggle against the government. About 100 environmental organizations across the nation have joined forces in an Environmental Emergency Commission. However, public opinion hardly seems favorable to these environmental organizations and their cause. In fact, the public paid scant attention when these environmental organizations traveled across the country to hold rallies, during which prominent environmental activists sought to publicize the dire state of Korea’s environment. Additional efforts to heighten public awareness included the staging of extended sit-in demonstrations by environmental activists and lengthy hunger strikes by commission representatives. A national pro-environment rally organized by the Environmental Emergency Commission, during which an environmental emergency was declared and government policy denounced, was attended by only a few hundred people and failed to attract public attention. The activities of the Green Action Corps, which conducted a one-month tour of the country in early January to condemn instances of environmental degradation, did not seem to elicit much sympathy or interest among the people either. The incumbent government’s adoption of an anti-environment policy had been anticipated from the time when President Roh first took office. Therefore, exactly what have those involved in the environmental movement been doing for the last two years, and why are they only now saying that we are facing a crisis situation? Moreover, why have they failed to garner the public’s support despite their staging of sit-in demonstrations, hunger strikes, and two-month-long rallies throughout the country? In reviewing what environmental organizations have been doing in the name of the current “environmental emergency,” I can only reflect upon the fact that, as one journalist has so aptly observed, the current situation is evidence of not only a crisis of our environment, but also of a crisis within the environmental movement itself. Only recently, environmental activists have come to realize that the environmental movement itself is experiencing a crisis; however, the movement has exhibited crisis-like symptoms for at least the past two years. This crisis has finally been acknowledged in the form of the Environmental Emergency Commission, which was launched last year to address the so-called “environmental crisis.” The Roh Moo-hyun administration assumed office with two environment-related priorities on its plate: one, development of the nuclear waste facilities, as announced by the Kim Dae-jung administration at the end of its term, and two, the Saemangeum reclamation project, a constant source of controversy throughout President Kim’s tenure. Although these projects were not initiated by the incumbent government, they did represent significant issues that the Roh administration could not afford to abandon, even in the face of staunch resistance from environmental organizations. Consequently, the clash between the government and the environmental movement intensified, along with the gap between the two sides becoming wider than ever. It is noteworthy to point out that while the government was unable to proceed with these two projects because of resistance from local residents and environmental organizations, the environmental movement was not able to capitalize on this situation. Although tangible results were achieved, including cancellation of the planned construction of a nuclear waste facilities project in Buan and temporary postponement of the Saemangeum reclamation project, the residents of Buan and ordinary citizens attributed these outcomes to the efforts of religious figures, such as the Catholic priest Mun Kyu-hyun and Won-Buddhist monk Kim In-kyung. Conversely, local residents did not highly regard environmental organizations. As for these two projects, the Korean Federation for the Environmental Movement put forth the most active efforts. Of note, although the protest campaign against the construction of nuclear waste disposal facilities in Buan attracted nationwide attention, the number of members of the Korean Federation for the Environmental Movement(KFEM) actually decreased from 8,000 to 7,000 in 2004 (The Hankyoreh, December 12, 2004). Crisis of the Environmental Movement Why were environmental organizations, despite their fervid activism related to these high-profile projects during last two years, unable to garner public support, while even experiencing a decline in membership in 2004? The downward trend in the number of members is often attributed to the ongoing economic slump. Further compounding this situation is a lack of effort to encourage more active citizen participation. Moreover, the direction and methods employed by the environmental movement are criticized for lacking a “vision and commitment to change the world” (Cho Hong-seop, “Crisis of the Environment, Crisis of the Environmental Movement,” The Hankyoreh, December 6, 2004). I believe that this decrease in membership is a clear indication of a crisis within the environmental movement. As such, attributing the dwindling of membership primarily to the sluggish economy seems to be based on a superficial analysis. Environmental organizations often link a decline in membership to financial difficulty, which reveals that members are regarded less as participants than a source of much-needed revenue to fund the activities and operations of the organizations. Changes in the number of “legitimate” members, who pay membership fees, are an important indicator of the strength, viability, and potential of an environmental organization, whether it seeks to function as a grassroots network or a lobbying group. Any organization that denies this reality will eventually lose its identity as a civic group. Even without the receipt of membership fees, organizations are able to secure funding from such sources as contributions from for-profit enterprises, sponsorship arrangements with businesses, and government-related contracts. Furthermore, such organizations are free to engage in lobbying and campaigning activities. Of course, once an organization decides to go down this path, the number of members becomes increasingly less important, along with the related membership fees being only a secondary consideration. On the other hand, support from businesses or the government has become an important funding source for an organization’s core activities. If this situation is allowed to continue, ever more professional and staff activists working for such organizations will come to think more and more that the leaders of these groups are themselves rather than participating as environmental activists. No environmental organization in Korea rejects the significance of its membership, as a vast majority emphasizes the critical need to maintain a close bond with their members. However, these organizations give little consideration to their members and membership fees when planning their primary activities, and there are only few cases in which membership fees account for more than one-half of an organization’s total operating budget. Rather, the lion’s share of funding for their operating costs comes in the form of contributions from business enterprises or project contracts from the government or public foundations. Naturally, there is a ready-made excuse for this situation: the available funding is inadequate to support the ever-increasing scope of activities of environmental organizations. If the scope of activities is expanded, the number of staff activists will have to be increased as well, along with administrative personnel and operating expenses. And if these costs cannot be covered by the membership fees, then organizations are compelled to look for external assistance, such as contributions from business firms. However, these organizations cannot be assured of receiving steady financial support from private enterprises on a continuous basis. In particular, corporate donors will typically determine what amount of support would be sufficient to advance their own interests, while the approval of such contributions and specific amounts are often influenced by personal relationships. Under these circumstances, organizations can increase the number of staff activists when they receive large contributions, but may be strapped for funds for paying their staff when such assistance decreases. Can staff activists be expected to carry out their activities in a professional manner when they are not paid on a timely basis, and their compensation is rather minimal to begin with? Indeed, a considerable number of staff activists with the larger environmental organizations in Korea are forced to endure low pay, high stress due to the frequent protests that they must participate in, and the lack of a clear vision on the part of their organization. According to medical examinations conducted at the Green Hospital in the fall of 2004, the health of environmental activists was said to be seven times worse than that of regular office workers (“Red Light for Civic Activists,” The NGO Times, September 15, 2004). Although Korea’s environmental activists are known to be working under such difficult circumstances, they have been successful in gaining easier access to the corridors of power. The dialogue and cooperation between environmental organizations and the government, which began during the Kim Dae-jung administration, has become more active since the inauguration of the incumbent administration. Official and unofficial contacts were taking place even when the fierce struggle against the construction of a nuclear waste facilities project in Buan seemed to be on the verge of raging out control, causing some government officials to suggest that martial law would be needed to maintain order. The fruit of these contacts, and also the symbol of underlying problems, was manifested in the Citizen-Government Joint Forum on Energy Policy, which was established as a result of an agreement between environmental organizations and the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy in April 2004. During a preparatory meeting, the ministry proposed that this forum be responsible for reviewing the government’s overall energy policy, including its policy for nuclear waste disposal facilities, and, if necessary, to form a task force team to devise energy policy. Most environmental organizations supported acceptance of the ministry’s proposal, which led to the launch of a supposedly landmark “governance” body. But just two months later, the forum ran aground without any fruitful results when all ten civic organizations announced their withdrawal. The environmental organizations seemed to have had high hopes for the Citizen-Government Joint Forum on Energy Policy. As indicated in a statement released by the Anti-Nuke Citizens Action Network, which stated that efforts had been made to promote energy policy governance by creating a social consensus and properly planning and implementing energy policy in conjunction with the government through dialogue and cooperation on energy issues, environmental organizations made known their desire to be directly involved in energy policy. However, the attempt to promote such cooperative governance between the government and environmental organizations ended in failure after just two months due to a falling-out of the two sides. The environmental organizations blamed the government for this breakdown, in claiming that the Roh administration had violated the initial agreement by not canceling the scheduled construction of a nuclear waste disposal project, in addition to rejecting a proposal from environmental organizations to set up the agreed-upon task force. Whatever the case, the agreement reached for the establishment of this forum should have been cause for concern for anyone even the least bit interested about the direction of the environmental movement. It remains highly questionable that these environmental organizations, which while working for the public’s interests are after all voluntary groups, should be allowed to participate in a joint policymaking team with the government that has been duly empowered by the electorate and is thus responsible for the administration of state affairs. However, these environmental organizations continue to proudly claim that they attempted to form such a cooperative team in order to implement an effective energy policy. As a result, environmental organizations may now believe that direct involvement in government policy is an integral component of the environmental movement. Previously, the primary objective of environmental organizations was focused on rallying opposition to government activities; however, during the Kim Dae-jung administration they came to play somewhat more of an advisory role. But under the current government, environmental organizations seem to be occupied by a notion that they should now move beyond such an advisory role and fully participate in the actual governance process. What’s next? The ultimate direction of the environmental movement has never been more muddled and unclear. Failure of Public-Government Forum The establishment of a joint policy planning team by the government and environmental organizations can be evaluated as an advanced step not often seen in other countries. However, the fact that it was quickly dissolved, regardless of which party was responsible for the breakup, reveals that both the government and environmental organizations had a serious disparity in their perceptions of the environmental movement. As such, this task force formation indicated that the government sees environmental organizations as a partner in the policymaking process, while environmental organizations believe it as only natural that they be directly involved in the making of government policy. Such perceptions were a primary factor behind the agreement to form this joint policymaking team. However, it was a divergence of perceptions that subsequently led to the demise of this advanced initiative. Participation in such a body represented a significant departure from the original principles of the environmental movement, and was destined to be the subject of serious controversy in regard to such issues as due representation and validity. Similar disputes can arise when environmental organizations are allowed to participate in government committees as well. Of course, since most government committees play an advisory role, environmental organizations could use these forums to make known their concerns and opinions. However, even such instances can result in controversy when carefully scrutinized, and potentially lead to environmental organizations being used as a government adjunct. The formation and then quick dissolution of the Citizen-Government Joint Forum on Energy Policy was little known by the public. Not much discussion occurred even among environmental organizations, which simply thought that another dialogue channel with the government had been launched and then canceled when it was found to be nonfunctional. However, the government and observers who are well aware of the situation have questioned the credibility of the subject environmental organizations. The government halfheartedly threw environmental organizations a bone by forming a forum that it planned to use as a means to resolve the problem of securing sites for nuclear waste facilities and to facilitate discussion about energy policy, including nuclear energy issues. The environmental organizations latched on to this bone without so much of a second thought, only to spit it out when it was found not to suit their taste. If in fact the environmental organizations behaved in this manner, then how can they be trusted? This kind of outcome might have been inevitable from the outset. And in this case, the proper choice would have been not to accept the government’s proposal in the first place. Environmental organizations will end up the losers if they seek to align themselves with the government even when offered a less than forthright proposal. It thus should be remembered that the government exercises power that has been entrusted to it by the public, while environmental organizations are voluntary groups that have to continuously prove their worth to maintain their credibility. The Environmental Emergency Commission can be seen as an attempt by the environmental movement to publicize its opposition to the current government’s efforts to proceed with large-scale projects that have the potential to cause massive environmental destruction. It can also be interpreted as a desperate attempt to overcome the crisis that has engulfed the environmental movement, due to its lack of foresight and a subsequent loss of public confidence. However, it is questionable whether the Environmental Emergency Commission did in fact come about as a result of any concerted effort to address such matters. To appeal to the people, reinforce member support, and regain public trust, the environmental movement should have prepared more thoroughly by conducting in-depth discussion before taking any definitive action. The movement can hardly hope to appeal to its members and the general public if the declaration of an “emergency,” followed by sit-down demonstrations and a hunger strike by their “representatives,” are perceived as for-show events staged without adequate preparation. When one such “representative” hunger-strike participant ends up being appointed presidential secretary for environmental affairs, the legitimacy of such hunger strike and sit-in demonstration events begins to pale, while themes such as “Into the Public, Together with the Public” are dismissed as merely empty slogans. In the end, any sit-in demonstration or hunger strike in the name of an “emergency” runs the risk of being seen as just another publicity stunt. Therefore, it is doubtful that even those environmental activists involved with the Environmental Emergency Commission regard the public as stakeholders of environmental organizations or sources of support for the movement. The larger and older an environmental organization becomes, the more likely it is that its activists will fail to recognize its members as being stakeholders of the organization. There may be member representatives, executive committees, and meetings of representatives, but important decisions are for the most part made by a secretary-general or core staff activists. Moreover, the sharp decline in the number of their members is not thought to be a serious problem. When the number of members, and the related membership fees, begin to trend downward, organizations should candidly reflect on their practices and adopt bold reform measures to rectify any shortcomings. Such a reform process cannot be effective when activists think of themselves as the exclusive owners of these organizations. As such, self-reflection and restructuring of the environmental movement will be necessary in order to overcome the crises of our environment and the environmental movement. Such a restructuring can only be successful when members are regarded as stakeholders and the general public as a legitimate partner. Restoration of Public Trust Members of environmental organizations and the general public are not as passive as they might seem to be. It is true that many are casual onlookers, but a considerable number are concerned observers and active participants. Based on my more than four years of experience as part of the environmental movement, I can safely say that concerned members of the general public as well as those of environmental organizations always keep a close eye on matters that affect our environment. They become active members when, after personal observation, they come to share the views of the movement and desire to lend support through membership fees. They do not simply become members all of a sudden. When such members come to more strongly embrace the activities of a particular organization, they begin to directly participate in its activities and become staunch supporters. If these organizations believe that the right direction for the movement is to be member-oriented and “one with the public,” then they should always consider the interests of their members and the general public. Above all, members and the general public earnestly desire that environmental organizations be of unquestionable integrity. They do not like to see the provision of any form of funding or assistance by the business sector or government. Of course, they strive to understand the inevitable reality since membership fees alone cannot support the operating costs these organizations incur to carry out the multitude of tasks in need of attention. However, they still think of this as a less than ideal situation. As for their relations with the government, the public would prefer for these organizations to maintain their independence. Also, they do not find it desirable for those involved in the civic movement to directly influence the policymaking process, or to accept political appointments. Members and the general public, as active observers, would like environmental organizations to uphold their principles to the maximum extent possible. Indeed, it is most confusing to the public when these organizations appear to be working cooperatively with the government on a particular matter, and then they suddenly turn around and launch a protest campaign. They want to see environmental organizations push forward with their own vision and objectives without being swayed by outside influences. Environmental activists may not be highly paid but they are in an advantageous position in terms of their access to government officials. Manager-level activists within environmental organizations can often discuss matters with director general-level government officials on an equal footing, while at times director-level activists will be able to meet with ministers. On the other hand, the directors of private businesses or public corporations have to deal mainly with director-level or program officers. The reality is, that while the directors of public corporations can have a hard time meeting with even program officers, environmental activists can readily gain access to senior-ranking officials. This is because they pursue public, as opposed to private, interests and are supported by environmental organizations and the general public, although this is not always apparent on the surface. Although those actively involved in the environmental movement should always be mindful of this situation, they often seem to not do so in reality. They seem to think of themselves as being the core of the movement, which leads them to believe they are entitled to negotiate and set up joint bodies with the government, and even exert influence on the policymaking process. Of course, discussions and negotiations with the government are necessary to make known their concerns and opinions. However, such efforts must be undertaken within reasonable principles and parameters. Moreover, in order to maintain their credibility and attract new members without causing confusion, the decisions reached by these organizations, after extensive discussion, should not be altered without proper justification. Such expectations to uphold their principles should not be taken to mean that members and the public insist on the adoption of a confrontational approach or all-out struggle at all times. While reform and change are desired, they do not believe that genuine reform can be realized through extreme measures or fierce struggle. At this time when considerable democratization has been attained, people yearn for reform brought about through an expansion of constructive discussion and thoughtful consideration of policy alternatives. Fierce struggles seem more suited for countries with a lower level of democratization. Members and the public are not only quick to criticize governmental abuse of power, they also frown upon the extreme actions taken by environmental organizations. An enlightened public tends to shun endless and hollow calls for reform, while eagerly awaiting meaningful reform, on the part of the government as well as environmental organizations. For this reason, quite a number of people, although sympathetic to her cause, did not endorse the Buddhist nun Jiyul’s launch of a hunger strike to protest the construction of a high-speed railway tunnel through Mt. Cheonseong. They prefer a problem like this to be resolved not through an extreme method like fasting, but rather constructive and frank discussion. As such, they would favor wide-ranging discussion of the proposed tunnel’s impact on Mt. Cheonseong, problems related to possible alternatives, and issues linked to the high-speed railway project and transportation policy. It is said that such discussions do not generate media attention, and thus fail to arouse interest among the general public. However, this does not mean that the environmental movement should continue to rely on sit-in demonstrations and hunger strikes. Of course, high-profile opposition is needed when the government chooses to ignore resident concerns and recklessly pushes through with its plans, as was the case in Buan. Nationwide support was readily evident when local resistance peaked in Buan. However, it must be remembered that the most critical factor behind the ability of the protest efforts in Buan to attract nationwide interest and support was the fact that the residents challenged the government’s nuclear energy policy. In doing so, the public came to see that this opposition was not simply another NIMBY situation. Moreover, the daily candlelight vigils over a period of seven months gained the public’s sympathy. Discussions conducted in an orderly manner may not be of much interest to the media initially. However, the continuation of such dialogue in a productive and earnest manner will gradually attract attention to the subject issue. As more people develop an interest and the public becomes better informed, the number of members in environmental organizations will increase as well. Moreover, change sometime begins with small steps that can build momentum and lead to reform. The environmental movement should thus be guided by the following theme: the pursuit of an alternative form of movement, which is based on truthfulness and integrity, to help build a foundation for the eventual adoption of meaningful change.[ The Quarterly Changbi ,Spring 2005]

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